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EDITOR'S DESK:

How long can Portugal sustain its colonial wars? What would be the consequences of a Portuguese withdrawal? Portugal risks defeat more from a collapse of the will to fight on the home front than from military action. Coetano, on taking office as Prime Minister, raised the blinds slightly on a society where they had been drawn for more than 40 years, but he has shown little ability to manipulate the amount of light allowed to enter, either in the form of political concessions or moves towards economic modernization.

Were his regime to stop defining its situation in "either-or" terms, the task of domestic reform and a negotiated transfer of power to the African nationalists could begin. But Coetano seems at present to consider that a failure to continue the debilitating and militarily stalemated colonial wars is a *sine qua non* of retaining power in Lisbon.

The Portuguese will to fight could be significantly eroded by a diminution of support from its allies. Portugal's presence in NATO is becoming increasingly embarrassing at a time when the Azores base is strategically insignificant. It seems possible that the West German Government under Chancellor Brandt will re-examine its military and political commitments to Lisbon. Washington should do the same. Portugal will most need its friends when the negotiations begin for the entry of Britain and other members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) into the European Economic Community (EEC). Lisbon's agreement to a gradual transfer of power in Africa might well be used as a *quid pro quo* for according it the preferential treatment it will desperately need to fit into the EEC. Where would such a transfer of power leave the colonies?

Guinea (Bissau) should be able to join the ranks of the more promising independent West African states. It is blessed with outstanding leadership, and modest resources which do not tempt possible interveners. Angola is the economic plus of Portugal's possessions and the list of bidders is lengthy. The divisions between its nationalist movements are deep, and perhaps irreconcilable. It will need massive help on generous terms if it is to avoid a repetition of the Congo post-independence experience.

But Mozambique is the strategic prize. It holds the key to the survival of the renegade white Rhodesian regime and even to the first important chink in the South African armor. One major risk is South African intervention to replace Lisbon with a tame, perhaps ostensibly multiracial, government in Lourenço Marques. Only a reversal of policy by the Western powers can deter South Africa from such an intervention if Portugal falters.

Aaron Segal

Views expressed in "Africa Report" editorials are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of either the publisher or the staff.

OUT OF AFRICA:

FIRST-HAND REPORTS FROM OUR CORRESPONDENTS

Zambia: Kaunda on top

President Kaunda has emerged from one of the most trying periods of his political career with unprecedented power and authority. Faced with increasing tribal friction, a tussle for power and influence among rival political factions, growing anti-white sentiment among members of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and serious industrial and political indiscipline, he has managed to overcome for the time being the more pressing problems facing his administration and give Zambia a much needed period of political and economic stability.

In the course of the last year, the 45-year-old President has taken personal control of UNIP, which was in danger of foundering through tribal feuds; dismissed the party's policy-making body, the central committee; banned strikes; imposed a wages freeze (which was recently modified); nationalized the giant foreign-owned copper mines, and placed himself at the head of the Government's newly acquired industrial and mining empire; and subdued his wayward Vice-President, Simon Kapwepwe.

There were times when it appeared that Kaunda was beginning to lose his touch. He seemed indecisive, wavering dangerously when tough action was most needed. He let things slide in the middle of 1969 to such an extent that a senior Cabinet Minister was permitted to make racial statements at a political rally in defiance of Kaunda's own policies, without any kind of rebuke. It was apparent that the President, working under heavy political pressure, was for a time unable to set things straight. As it happened he recovered his form only just in time.

Kaunda's main problem has been the growing rivalry between Zambia's major tribes. The trouble started in August 1967, during the elections for the party's central committee. Simon Kapwepwe, the acknowledged leader of the Bemba tribe (who was at that time Foreign Minister)

was elected UNIP vice-president—an extremely important position, since the holder automatically became Vice-President of Zambia. At the same time a number of other Bemba took over party posts at the expense of less dominant tribes, notably the Lozi from the west and the Eastern Province tribes. Bitterness over the results was aggravated by mismanagement over the counting of the votes. A High Court investigation showed that the results were fair, but suspicions of rigging remained.

These events set the stage for an increasingly hostile conflict between the major tribes and the politicians who represented them. On one side were the Bemba, led by Kapwepwe, whose militant and uncompromising attitudes had made him the hero of the north. The Bemba had formed the backbone of UNIP during the independence campaign and were now moving to consolidate their power.

Ranged against the Bemba and their allies in the north were most of the other tribes—principally the Lozi, who although they remained supporters of UNIP were becoming increasingly discontented with what they regarded as growing Bemba control over both Government and party. The southern Tanga were also opposed to the Bemba—but they traditionally supported Harry Nkumbula's opposition African National Congress.

Tribal rivalry within the Government and UNIP reached such a point in February 1968 that Kaunda resigned for a few hours, in the hope of shocking his party out of its dissension. Kapwepwe's followers thereupon urged him to take over. The Vice-President refused, knowing that he would face too much opposition within the party, but behind-the-scenes maneuvering continued.

Later in 1968, the Lozi began to build up their own organization, the United Party, to oppose UNIP. Sporadic tribal violence between UP Lozi and UNIP Bemba broke out on the Copperbelt a few months before the country was due to hold the first general election since in-

dependence in 1964, and Kaunda decided to ban the UP. In the December election, the Lozi voted overwhelmingly for the opposition ANC, and the country was divided almost geographically between tribes supporting the Government and those which opposed it (see "The Zambian General Election," *Africa Report*, January 1969).

The battle for control inside UNIP still went on. Kaunda himself was becoming increasingly uncertain of which way to turn in order to avoid the approaching crisis. Indiscipline was rife, and Ministers were allowed to make statements in open defiance of Kaunda's views without any rebuke. The Bemba faction grew more belligerent, and their chauvinism, anti-white feeling, and desire for more radical Government policies became a more influential factor on the political scene.

Kaunda's disastrous confrontation with the country's white judges in July 1969, which led Chief Justice James Skinner to resign, resulted from a combination of the pressures under which Kaunda was working and his own inept handling of the issue. The quarrel over the High Court's decision to free two Portuguese soldiers who had strayed across the border from Angola revealed how dangerous Kaunda's emotional assessment of the case was, and betrayed to what extent anti-white feeling had taken hold of UNIP. The anti-white demonstrations which followed the quarrel shocked the President, and led him to make a thorough reassessment of Zambia's political and economic future. The task was urgent, since his party was in danger of disintegrating through tribal rivalry.

At the UNIP national council meeting in August 1969, seven out of the country's eight provinces were due to deliver motions of no confidence in Kapwepwe, but Kaunda dissolved the meeting before anybody could speak, announced that the Government would take over ownership of the country's mineral rights and nationalize the foreign-owned copper mines, and sent delegates home to defend "the

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economic revolution". This swift action was not sufficient in itself to put the party back into working order. The central committee and the Cabinet were hardly functioning; some members were not on speaking terms. Urgent surgery of the party and the Government apparatus was needed. The President therefore took personal control over UNIP and abolished the central committee, which had become incapable of decisive action because of feuds among its members. An interim executive committee was appointed to act as the party's temporary overseer until a new system was devised, and party posts were scrapped. Kaunda led the party as secretary-general and set up a commission to work out a new party constitution.

The President's choice of action in August 1969 was complicated at the last minute by Kapwepwe's decision to resign, in order as he said to avoid tribal bloodshed. Kapwepwe attacked his colleagues in the Cabinet on the ground that they had never accepted his election to the Vice-Presidency. He also made the mistake of revealing that he was primarily concerned with the interests of one section of the community, the Bemba, whose members, he claimed were being victimized.

The President appealed to Kapwepwe to remain as Vice-President for another year in the interests of national unity. If Kapwepwe had refused he would have cast himself as a purely tribal leader, besides, it was essential that he remained in the Government to assure the Bemba that they still mattered. He therefore returned to the fold, but with greatly reduced responsibilities. In recent months he and his followers have remained subdued—but the maneuvering still goes on beneath the surface and will increase as August 1970 approaches, when Kapwepwe and all the other Cabinet Ministers will have to stand for re-election to the party posts created by the new UNIP constitution when it is worked out.

Kaunda's own position remains secure. He has by no means seen the last of his

troubles, but for the time being he has succeeded in overcoming them. He now hopes to divert attention away from tribal rivalries and direct the Government towards the major task of development.

*Martin Meredith
writes from Lusaka*

South Africa/Rhodesia

Though South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, has virtually assured the new Rhodesian republic of continued economic support, there is a distinct lack of enthusiasm in Government circles over Rhodesia's constitution, with its racially mixed Parliament.

The Vorster Government's attitude to Rhodesia is ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a strong emotional affinity between the white populations of the two countries (in fact many Rhodesian whites, including members of Smith's Cabinet, are of South African origin), and ordinary white South Africans are solidly pro-Smith. Officially, too, it is in South Africa's interest to see that the Smith Government is not brought down by sanctions, because that would encourage South Africa's opponents to campaign more actively for the extension of sanctions against South Africa. South Africa therefore gives Rhodesia all the economic support it can afford, and indeed it has been the main sanctions-breaker since UDI in 1965.

On the other hand, the Vorster Government is not happy about the instability which the Rhodesian dispute has brought to Southern Africa. The African guerrilla movement which UDI brought in its wake is directed as much against South Africa as it is against the Rhodesian regime. Vorster has had to send armed units across the border to fight alongside Rhodesian units on Rhodesian soil—a potentially dangerous extra-territorial involvement—and the troubled Southern African situation is being increasingly brought under international scrutiny. This is exactly what Vorster has tried to avoid.

South Africa's misgivings over Rhodesia's

constitution have been expressed quite openly. Rhodesia will have a 23-man Senate (ten whites, ten African tribal chiefs, and three Senators appointed by the President), and initially a 66-member House of Assembly (50 elected Europeans, eight elected Africans, and eight chiefs, headmen or African councillors, who will be appointed by tribal electoral colleges). Though control is securely in white hands, by apartheid standards this constitutes a multiracial Parliament which can never work. The fundamental premise of apartheid is that whites should never share their institutions with Africans, because in the long run they will be overwhelmed by the Africans' superior numbers unless they maintain total dominance.

When Rhodesia first published its Constitution Bill last year, a Cape Town newspaper which supports Vorster commented: "Up till now the Rhodesian state has rested on the principle of black liberation within one structure with the whites. After a long period of erosion, there is now nothing left of this basis. The distant aim is nothing more than parity, which it is to be foreseen will also be scrapped if it should ever really threaten to come nearer. What remains is the course South Africa has chosen with white and black political rights: separate political institutions, with no ceiling for political development in the black homelands."

"It did not take us a day or a few years to progress to this point in our thinking . . . it is thus not in a spirit of concealment or as a know-all that we look at Rhodesia's problem. But for the whites there—one to 16 in the whole population—we see no future in the long run if the question of self-government and freedom for the black people is not ultimately faced more frankly."

This same newspaper, commenting on Rhodesia's declaration of a republic, has now prophesied that the new constitution can at best be temporary, and then it will have to be "drastically amended to a greater or lesser degree under the conflicting pressure of the black people's de-

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mand for self-determination and the will of the whites to determine their own destiny." That is, apartheid supporters in South Africa believe that Rhodesia ultimately will have to abandon its multiracial Parliament and turn to apartheid if white dominance is to be maintained. This will mean establishing "homelands" for the Africans where they can develop to independence, and then giving them the economic and other aid needed to build up these "homelands."

Mr. Smith, however, has rejected apartheid because, as he told a South African newspaper recently, one look at Rhodesia's map showed that the fragmented nature of the "homelands" made this solution quite impossible.

This significant difference between South Africa and Rhodesia over Rhodesia's constitutional approach to the race problem makes it likely that there will be a certain aloofness between these two countries for some time to come.

Stanley Uys
"Sunday Times", Johannesburg

Tanzania nationalizes

Tanzania's recent nationalization of the *Tanzania Standard* and *Sunday News* breaks the post-Uhuru pattern of non-African ownership of English and vernacular dailies in East Africa. The East African Standard group and its competitors, East Africa Newspapers (Nation Series), controlled 90 per cent of all daily news-

paper circulation in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. This near-monopoly of a non-African press has been highly criticized by East Africans and prompted the Tanzanian take-over.

The Standard group also owns the dominant English daily in Uganda, the *Uganda Argus*, and the parent English daily in Nairobi, *East African Standard*, as well as the Kenyan Swahili weekly, *Baraza*. The combined circulation of the Standard group was more than 100,000. The three English dailies originated before independence with the *Nairobi Standard* dating back to the turn of the century as the strong voice of the settler community. A few years ago, *Tomba, Ltd.*, a diversified British company operating across Africa, including

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South Africa, purchased the Standard group of newspapers. This purchase and the earlier settler heritage of the Standard have been a major bone of contention among East Africans, especially in Tanzania.

The Nation Series is largely owned by the Aga Khan. Its publications include the Kenyan Daily Nation and Sunday Nation, both in English, and Taifa Leo in Swahili; the Sunday Nation and Uganda Taifa Moya in Uganda, and until a ban two years ago, Taifa Tanzania in Tanzania. The Nation Series' circulation nears that of the Standard group.

The Tanzania Government's move may have repercussions in Uganda. In Tanzania, the Standard's expertise overpowered the Government party's small circulation daily, The Nationalist. A similar situation exists in Uganda where the Argus has effectively held sway over other English dailies, including the English newspaper of Uganda's ruling party, The People. To date, The People has not been financially successful. Thus, the Tanzanian situation is being closely watched in Uganda, where a similar move against the Argus has been considered in recent years by President Obote's leftward-moving government.

Pressure to take over Lonrho's Tanzania newspapers had been mounting for several years. In mid-1968 the Tanzania Parliament amended its Newspaper Ordinance to allow the President to ban in the public interest a newspaper which prints anything undesirable. This amendment was aimed expressly at the Standard's foreign ownership and not at locally owned papers. In early 1969, Tanzania's "Green Guards" (the TANU Youth league) demonstrated repeatedly before the Standard's Dar es Salaam office, and TANU's daily newspaper, The Nationalist, kept up the protest against non-African ownership.

After the announcement was made on the eve of the Arusha Declaration's third anniversary, Tanzania's High Commissioner in London, Philemon Paul Muro, said: "It is wrong for such an important paper to

be in the hands of a firm which has interests in South Africa and which is a capitalist organization while we in Tanzania are pursuing a socialist policy."

The takeover, announced by President Nyerere, left all the previous staff in their jobs, except the Editor. Nyerere urged the newspaper to continue its policy of exposing faults in the Tanzanian Government. As if in response, the new official Tanzania Government newspaper, The Standard, immediately splashed a story of a Nigerian student detained without charge in a Dar es Salaam prison for nearly six weeks and called for an exhaustive inquiry into prison conditions. Nyerere said The Standard is also to be completely free from interference on a day-to-day basis but will receive policy directives from the President himself.

This experiment raises the question of whether an effective East African press can best operate under a Tanzanian type socialism or a Western type capitalism. East African journalists and governments are therefore watching the experiment with keen interest.

A correspondent in Dar es Salaam

Francophone agency

The presence of a delegate from Louisiana, which claims to have 1.3 million French-speaking inhabitants, was only one of the unusual aspects of the eventful Conference of Francophone Peoples held in Niamey in March—the conference which led to the formal establishment of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation provisionally set up at the earlier Niamey conference in February 1969.

The Louisiana delegate caused no stir. By contrast Canada, which was represented by 18 delegates—including spokesmen for the provinces with French-speaking populations (Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Manitoba) as well as Federal Government representatives—created problems which held up proceedings for almost three days.

Things began well enough. Thirty-four

countries were invited to the conference, and 26 accepted. Switzerland and Mauritania refused to take part, and six other countries failed to reply. Apart from national delegations, a number of associations representing writers, academics, Francophone youth movements, etc., also took part. The role of these non-governmental organizations in the proposed agency was one of the most controversial topics of the conference.

The disagreements began as soon as the Canadian provisional executive secretary, Jean-Marc Légaré, had presented the draft proposals for the agency, which he had been preparing since April 1969 with the aid of President Diouri of Niger. These proposals, besides defining the overall aims of the agency, included draft statutes which were immediately opposed by the French delegation. The plan put forward by Légaré (and President Diouri) provided for a powerful association of sovereign states, and envisaged multilateral cooperation between the signatories—not merely cultural exchanges, but major technical aid. France, on the other hand, wanted the agency to have a multiple membership, including national and provincial governments as well as non-governmental associations. France also wanted programs of cultural exchanges, not aid which might compete with existing forms of bilateral cooperation or with international bodies such as UNESCO.

There was also conflict over the basic functions of the agency, the problem of what national and provincial governments should have signatory rights, and the linked question of the cultural associations to which France wanted voting rights to be given.

At the start of a session full of imposed debates and rumors, a French delegate declared: "We have no intention of signing a second United Nations Charter," summing up an attitude which remained unchanged until the end of the conference. This stand was supported by Belgium, which wanted to preserve its own bi-

lateral agreements, especially with Congo [Kinshasa].

Belgium, Canada and a significant number of African nations proved very sensitive to problems of sovereignty and the role of separatist movements in the proposed agency. Though the presence of Quebec at the conference was approved by Ottawa, the Canadian Federal Government flatly opposed any attempt to give provincial or city governments the same voting rights as sovereign nations. After three days of discussion it was agreed to make a clear distinction between member states and associated states, central governments being given full membership, and provincial or other governments accorded associated status with signatory but not voting powers. Even this was made dependent on the agreement of the central government concerned.

The argument over the position of cultural and other associations was settled by the good offices of a conciliation group consisting of Senegal, Niger, Mali, Tunisia and Cameroun. Such groups will be admitted only as observers and consultants, so the French lost the argument over the status of non-governmental organizations—but they won their main point, the limitations of the agency to the cultural field.

Thus the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation finally came into being. Most of its budget of \$1.8 million will be devoted to scholarships and artistic exchanges. Jean-Marc Léger was confirmed as executive secretary with two assistants, one French and the other Togolese, and given the job of setting up an agency whose function, his original proposals had described as "not an organization at the service of the French language, but cooperation by means of the French language," and which has turned into a "Francophone cultural exchange".

The delegates are to meet again in Canada in two years' time. In the meantime the policies of bilateral cooperation so dear to the West will continue.

Marie-Claire Je Roy




Tribal Dancing

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Arms and the Portuguese

WHAT KINDS OF AID DOES PORTUGAL GET FROM ITS NATO ALLIES, AND WHAT IS ITS ROLE IN THE COLONIAL WARS?

By Basil Davidson

Portugal's three present colonial wars are the longest, largest and bloodiest of any Africa has ever known, with the exception of Algeria from 1954 to 1962. Nothing in recent years, save the Algerian war, can hold a candle to these outrageous flames of napalm and destruction begun by Salazar's regime in Angola from early 1961, in Guinea (Bissau) from early 1963, and in Mozambique from late 1964. Even when compared to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Portuguese commitment in human and material resources is tremendous.

These wars have strained Portugal's resources to the maximum possible limit. According to Portuguese Government budget figures, "defense and security" (which means largely the wars in Africa) have absorbed nearly 44 per cent of the total public expenditure every year since 1965, while accounting for more than 50 per cent of annual effective revenue (See *Africa Report*, November 1967).

Basil Davidson is a historian and journalist whose most recent works include "The Liberation of Guinea" and "Africa in History."

"Three Revolutions", and November 1969, "Portugal's Colonial Wars.")

Inevitably, this kind of spending has also meant the stripping of socially desirable expenditure in Portugal itself; and it is apparent that these wars are unpopular among the Portuguese not only because they are colonial wars, but also because they have eaten deeply into the slender fabric of everyday welfare. Every year, thousands of Portuguese young men flee compulsory military service and emigrate to France and other European Common Market countries.

More important, this massive and socially reckless effort of the Portuguese regime would not have been able to continue were it not for the commercial, economic and military aid of Portugal's allies in the West.

Commercially, Portugal's membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) includes some unique tariff advantages designed to shelter Portugal's fragile commercial structure from the winds of competition within EFTA. Economic aid comes in various forms, from large sums paid by the U.S. and France for the use of the Azores base to sub-

stantial and frequent capital and tourist inflows from Western Europe and the U.S.

Military aid has been extensive, various and continuous throughout the 1960s. Most of it has come from Portugal's NATO partners, with France and West Germany well in the lead. Formally, of course, none of these supplies to NATO are supposed to be used in Africa. France has never bothered with this formal prohibition, supplying Nord Atlas transports and Alouette helicopters without stipulation, but Britain and West Germany have made verbal conditions on their military aid. Thus, Britain could give arms and equipment to Portugal with the understanding that they were not to be used in Africa.

In 1966, the West German Government made this stipulation with reference to its sale of 40 Fiat G-91 fighter-bombers designed for NATO. The West Germans have also supplied more than 100 light aircraft carrying wing-fixed air-to-ground rockets.

Finally, the United States has supplied the Portuguese Air Force with a total of 50 Thunderjet fighters since 1952, some 30 Cessna aircraft for training and security work (Portugal only paying for 12 of them), a large number of Harvard trainers, 18 Lockheed bombers (PV-2 Harpoons), and 12 other Lockheed bombers.

Lisbon has gotten around this ban with its consistent claim that Angola, Mozambique and Guinea are within Portuguese territory. After receiving the West German Fiat's, a Lisbon Foreign Ministry spokesman explained: "The transaction was agreed within the spirit of the North Atlantic Pact . . . the planes would be used only for defensive purposes within Portuguese territory (which extends to Africa—Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea)." In 1951, Portugal had declared the colonies constitutionally as overseas provinces, and as such, integral parts of the beneficent metropolis. This was the same old device used by the regime since its admission to the UN in 1955 when it wanted to prevent direct inquiries into its colonies by the UN.

The Fiat G-91 planes illustrate NATO involvement in Portugal's colonial wars particularly well, having proved continuously useful to the

Portuguese Air Force in bombing "approximate" targets in African territories. (I say "approximate" because on the two occasions I witnessed these planes in action in Guinea, they dropped their napalm canisters and fragmentation bombs from an altitude of about 4,000 feet flying at several hundred miles an hour.) Originally, the G-91 was built for the U. S. Air Force in West German factories under an Italian license. Later on, the Luftwaffe used them. With an Italian airframe, a British engine, a French undercarriage, and Dutch electronic equipment, the Fiat G-91 is peculiarly suitable for "counter-insurgency operations" because it requires a relatively short runway.

This air support is certainly the most important type of military aid received by Portugal. Guerrilla units of the national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea have found it possible to outfight and outmatch the Portuguese on the ground, but they can do little or nothing against air attack. This is the real point of weakness for the liberation movements, as illustrated by personal experience. In July 1968, I attended the second Congress of about 150 delegates of FRELIMO, Mozambique's Liberation Front, in the Mozambique province of Nyasa not far from the Tanzanian border. Although it was publicly known that the Congress was taking place "somewhere in Mozambique" and the Portuguese had several garrisons within easy reach of the conference, they were unable to deploy any ground activity nor embark on any patrols for fear of guerrilla ambush and mined bush-roads. However, when the Portuguese Air Force finally located the venue on the last afternoon of the conference, they returned the next day to cover the place with bombs. Fortunately, everyone had left, and there were no casualties. On other occasions, when the Portuguese use napalm or phosphorus bombs (imported from Portugal's allies), villages suffer severely, and the quota of civilian casualties is sadly rising in all the Portuguese territories.

NATO supplies for Portugal's ground forces also provide support for its colonial wars, but are less important in terms of effective strike

power. Although the Portuguese manufacture most of their own small arms and light automatics, some are NATO types, such as the G-3, which is made under West German license. Less obvious, but no less useful aid to the regime includes West Germany's bilateral agreement with Portugal allowing wounded Portuguese soldiers to be treated in West German hospitals. It is not certain if this aid continues, but there has been no announcement that it has stopped.

Naval materiel has been purchased chiefly from Britain and more recently from West Germany and France. Two remodelled frigates bought in 1961 from the British Admiralty have been used to patrol the Angolan coast and the estuary of the Congo River. In 1969 the German Blohm and Voss shipyards began fulfilling an order for three small warships for a similar purpose. While the West German Government assured critics that these supplies to Portugal were not for use in Africa, Lisbon hastened to correct this in the *Revista de Marinha*: "On May 2 (1969), the 1,350-ton corvette *João Coutinho* was launched at the Blohm and Voss yards in Hamburg: it is the first of three vessels ordered in West Germany by the Portuguese Government for service in the overseas territories." A month later the journal added: "these corvettes will be provided with helicopters, and equipped for prolonged service overseas so as to support our fleet units of patrol boats and landing craft, as well as to carry out other duties over there." Between 1967 and '69, France supplied the Portuguese Navy with four frigates and four submarines costing \$100 million and financed by a long-term credit guaranteed by the French Government.

Western Europe's one exception to military aid to Portugal has been Sweden, which has provided support and aid to the nationalist side. In 1969 the ruling Swedish Social Democratic Party formally recognized effective independence movements in the Portuguese territories by inviting their representatives to attend its annual congress in Stockholm. At the congress, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Torsten Nilsson, confirmed the Government's decision to aid the African Independence Party of Guinea

and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) with a gift of more than \$190,000 in medical and other supplies as well as to continue cash aid to the Mozambique Liberation Front FRELIMO of more than \$130,000. (For FRELIMO, this has meant a total of about \$200,000 from Sweden since 1964.) The agency for these gifts is the para-statal Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA).

Moreover, in October 1969, the large private Gothenburg engineering corporation (ASEA) withdrew under public pressure from its participation in the Cahora Bassa dam project in Mozambique. This project was regarded in Sweden as a major economic reinforcement of white-minority and colonial rule in Southern Africa. ASEA withdrew mainly because its directors recognized that its participation was breaking Swedish sanctions against Rhodesia, which would gain from the project (see p. 20).

In Guinea (Bissau), the Portuguese have clearly lost the war on the mainland, and would probably agree to cut their losses and evacuate except for their fear that defeat there might be rapidly followed by defeat in the Cape Verde Islands. Neither in eastern-central Angola nor in northern Mozambique do the Portuguese seem to have regained any sure military initiative; nor have they been able to reduce their large armies there. In both Angola and Mozambique it would seem that the independence movements have long since passed the point of "installation" and are well into the second phase—characteristic of all successful guerrilla wars—of systematic self-reinforcement and mounting counter-offensive.

In view of the status of these wars and the success of Guinea (Bissau), and in terms of the Western world's continued furnishing of aid to Portugal through NATO, the great open questions now seem to be: how long can the Portuguese regime continue this all-consuming repressive effort, and, in the case of Portuguese failure, what will be the response of South Africa and its allies? In other words, when Portuguese defeat becomes imminent, what then will be the attitude and actions of the Western world?

Arms and the nationalists

WHERE AND ON WHAT TERMS DO THEY OBTAIN THEIR SUPPORT AND HOW IMPORTANT IS EXTERNAL AID TO THEIR REVOLUTION?

By Paul M. Whitaker

For a number of reasons, principally the extreme lack of political and economic development in the territories they are fighting to liberate, the African nationalist movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) rely heavily on various types of external aid.

This aid comes from four main sources: neighboring independent states where the movements have set up bases from which they direct their operations inside the Portuguese-controlled territories; the remainder of independent Africa, including collective aid through the African Liberation Committee (ALC) of the Organization for African Unity (OAU); the Soviet Union, Eastern European, and Asian Communist countries and Cuba; and the West.

Five nationalist movements conduct military activities in the Portuguese-controlled territories on a

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scale sufficient to deserve consideration (see "Three Revolutions," *Africa Report*, November 1967, and "Portugal at War: Hawks, Doves and Owls," *Africa Report*, November 1969). In Guinea the revolution is led by the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), continuing under the able direction of its secretary-general, Amilcar Cabral, despite the recent defection of its president, Raphael Barboza, to the Portuguese after some seven years of imprisonment and house arrest. The primary party opposing the Portuguese in Mozambique is the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), effectively carrying on its activities although recently split by a leadership crisis in the wake of the assassination of its president, Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, in February 1969 (see "A Martyr for Mozambique," *Africa Report*, March-April 1969).

In contrast, the nationalist movement in Angola is in extreme disarray, with three separate nationalist armies fighting the Portuguese and frequently one another. These are the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) of Holden Roberto, the Pop-

ular movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) under Agostinho Neto, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led from inside Angola by Jonas Savimbi.

All five nationalist movements display roughly similar approaches in their search for aid, but each has developed its own external contacts. These contacts depend partly on each movement's political orientation, and are conditioned by the policies of its host state (often the two aspects seem related), but the movements themselves appear to have no ideological objections to accepting aid from anyone offering it.

Most aid from the African states is coordinated through the African Liberation Committee (ALC), but the host states are particularly important in the provision of training bases and staging areas and also in some cases serve as alternate conduits for non-African assistance not channeled through the ALC. Frequently the hosts and their guests display a close alignment of political or ideological views, and presumably this similarity has been a factor in each movement's selection of its base of operations.

PAIGC has tight links with Conakry, FRELIMO operates from offices in Dar es Salaam, and MPLA's head-office functions are scattered among offices in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, and Brazzaville, though the movement maintains its official headquarters inside Angola. Together these three parties form an association called the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), which facilitates the sharing of information, and coordinates joint representation abroad, both at international gatherings and through permanent diplomatic "missions." GRAE operates from Kinshasa, and works closely with the Western-oriented Congolese government, UNITA, though it is officially banned in Zambia, runs a number of important activities through a clandestine Lusaka office as well as maintaining formal, and apparently also operational, headquarters inside Angola.

On the whole the host states are important less for the material aid they provide themselves, than for

the help they give liberation movements in acquiring supplies from other sources, in arranging for training overseas, and granting access to the combat zones. The limited military equipment available to Guinea (Conakry), Zambia and Tanzania in particular is on the whole unsuitable for the revolutionary movements and in any case there is not enough of it.

Arms produced in Eastern Europe and China are made directly available to the liberation movements, whereas arms produced in the West generally are not. Therefore, while the CONCP parties have received arms directly from their non-African suppliers, the Kinshasa-oriented GRAE has not been able to establish such effective ties with the East, and has come to rely upon weapons supplied by Congo (Kinshasa), which not only has the largest regular army of any of the host states but also has a surplus of older arms from the Katanga secession and the later rebellion, as well as a dependable source for buying new weapons from Western Europe. UNITA lacks a dependable channel of modern armaments, and has consequently suffered both military reverses and recent defections to the better trained and equipped MPLA.

It appears that the more intimate the association between a movement and its host, the more closely does the host state attempt to share control of the movement with the nationalist leaders. In particular, here are indications that GRAE has been required to help the Congolese army in preventing MPLA guerrillas en route from bases in Congo (Brazzaville) to fighting zones in northern Angola from traveling through Congo (Kinshasa). In return, GRAE has exclusive access to Angola's long border with the Congo (Kinshasa). In contrast UNITA's decline seems to be linked with Zambian displeasure. In mid-1967 repeated UNITA attacks on the Benguela Railroad, which crosses Angola to the Atlantic port of Lobito, and is vital for Zambian copper exports, caused the Zambian Government to take overt and effective steps to reduce its liability for the movement's actions. Its leader, Jonas Savimbi, was expelled from Zambia and the party was officially banned there. Hence UNITA has lost the con-

venience of being able to train guerrillas and to import arms into Zambia for transfer into Angola.

Aside from assistance given by the host states, aid from African countries falls into two categories: collective assistance through the OAU-ALC, and bilateral assistance from individual governments to specific movements. Until the formation of the OAU and its ALC in 1963, the second form of aid was far more important than it is today.

The official ALC policy has been to provide training and equipment (combat and logistic) to any movement shown to be maintaining an active fighting force. However, that policy has never been fully applied. For example, when the ALC was created both GRAE and MPLA were engaged in fighting inside Angola, but while GRAE was accorded *de jure* recognition by the OAU as the government of Angola, MPLA was denied all recognition and assistance until the following year, when GRAE's fortunes had begun a three-year decline. On the other hand, the ALC supported FRELIMO well before its military operations in Mozambique began.

More recently, the ALC has adopted a policy of recognizing and assisting only one movement per territory, generally the strongest militarily. Nevertheless, the ALC policies are subject to overall OAU political review, and when the ALC determined in May 1968 to withdraw recognition and aid from GRAE, the September OAU Summit Meeting reversed the decision and continued to allocate assistance. While the "exclusive recognition" policy has had little influence in reducing the inter-group rivalries of the Angolan, Zimbabwean, and South African nationalist parties, it has prevented the further divergence of scarce ALC resources into inter-ethnic conflict. Another consequence, perhaps more important than the reduction of nationalist rivalries, is that ALC support has principally gone to the parties which have for some time been receiving virtually all the aid given by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Because of the relatively low level of armed strength in independent Africa, the African assistance to the liberation movements has tended to em-

phasize training and financial and diplomatic support, rather than direct military aid in arms and equipment; still, some countries—particularly North African nations which receive a large amount of new Soviet equipment—have provided significant quantities of older small-arms. The quality of African bilateral aid seems to have been improving over the past three or four years, but the quantities from almost all but the host states have declined.

Bilateral aid from within Africa has advantages over ALC assistance, because it is normally designed to meet the needs of a given moment; it gives the movements a flexibility that is not always possible under the more immediate supervision of host-state donors. Moreover, bilateral aid is available to movements denied ALC recognition, and is in fact their only source of assistance from Africa. On the other hand, its flow is unpredictable, and its importance seems to be generally declining.

It is often claimed that the greater part of the resources for the liberation movements comes from Africa, but in fact most of the external support and assistance seems to come from non-African sources, in two basic categories: military and military-related aid from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Cuba; and humanitarian, educational, and refugee aid from all over, particularly from the West.

The primary source of external support for the military aspect of the liberation efforts is the Soviet Union, which with its Eastern European allies may provide up to 35 or 40 per cent of the total resources of the CONCP parties. Although GRAE had been an early recipient of Soviet assistance, the outbreak of the Congolese rebellion in 1964, followed by the rupture of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Kinshasa (then Léopoldville) reduced Soviet aid to GRAE to minimal levels. At the same time, the increasing Soviet aid to the overall liberation struggle in Southern Africa came to be concentrated almost exclusively on the CONCP parties and on the CONCP's South African and Rhodesian associates, respectively the African National Congress (ANC) and the Zimbabwe Afri-

can People's Union (ZAPU), along with the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

Soviet aid seems to have been largely free of one of the major inconveniences of Chinese aid, which is reported often to have been conditional on the recipient parties signing propaganda statements condemning the West for neo-colonialism or the Soviet Union for revisionism. Indeed nationalist leaders have occasionally been induced to sign such statements in the hope of a grant of weapons, only to be disappointed. As a result of these conditions, Chinese aid has lost much of the attraction it may once have had. FRELIMO, which receives the largest amount of Chinese assistance, has arranged to have all transfers officially made to the ALC through Tanzania, whose representative is chairman of the ALC, with the understanding that the arms are to be passed on to FRELIMO. Thus FRELIMO avoids offending the Soviets or the West by signing Chinese statements and continues to enjoy support from both the Soviet Union and China, while the ALC enhances its prestige by serving as the official channel of external resources for the liberation efforts.

One danger that does appear to arise for the recipients of Soviet aid is that of over-reliance upon a single

source. The willingness of the Soviet Union to bear a large portion of the burden of training and equipping the forces of a given movement is both a help and a hindrance in the struggle for independence. On the one hand, Soviet aid may relieve the nationalist leaders of worry about a continuing supply of arms and equipment, but on the other hand it may induce so great a reliance upon the single source of armaments that the independence of the party is undercut, as may for a time have been the case with the ANC. In an apparent effort to avoid this threat to the integrity of the leadership and to the political flexibility of the party, most of the nationalist movements from the Portuguese territories (including the more minor rivals) have sought to achieve some sort of balance in aid from the U.S.S.R., China, and the West, although each party has established a different ratio among the three. But the evolving patterns of foreign assistance have made this balanced approach difficult.

Aid from the rest of Eastern Europe and Asia has generally tended to follow the Soviet distribution pattern, but has been far less in quantity. Eastern European and Cuban aid has emphasized military training and educational and medical facilities, but significant quantities of arms (especially Czechoslovak and East Ger-

man) have also been supplied from time to time. Aid from the smaller Communist countries, particularly Cuba and those in Asia, is notably free from ideological or other strings.

Support from the West takes several forms, but little of it is military and most of it comes from private sources. A large number of private Church and humanitarian organizations have helped finance the refugee, relief, educational, and medical services established by the major liberation movements. Some private political groups have helped the nationalists to acquire equipment (usually logistic) and occasionally funded the purchase of more directly military-related supplies, although these are normally provided without cost by the Communist countries.

Although the U. S. continues to provide Portugal with arms through NATO and maintains a base on the Azores, at the same time the CIA appears to be second only to the Portuguese secret police in providing secret funds to the liberation movements. But unlike the Portuguese, who seek to use their funds to disrupt the nationalist forces, the United States hopes to gather information about the potential future leaders of independent countries and to win the friendship of those leaders by a clandestine display of sympathy for their efforts which NATO commitments and the Azores do not permit to be displayed openly (see p 15).

Two conclusions can be drawn from the patterns of aid to Angolan, Mozambican and Guinea (Bissau) nationalist groups. First, the African and Communist states are strongly committed to the liberation of the Portuguese African territories by the only means seen to be available—guerrilla warfare. Second, the nationalists are equally strongly committed to the achievement of total political and economic independence. Their desire for non-alignment even in their present circumstances is shown by their efforts to achieve a balance among their sources of assistance.

Given the difficulties inherent in so great a dependence on outside help, what is really remarkable is how well these aid relationships have worked.

FRELIMO men with a Soviet anti-aircraft machinegun.



Portugal and the United States

ATLANTIC ISLANDS AND
EUROPEAN STRATEGY
AS PAWNS IN
AFRICAN WARS

By Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet

"If we could get the Pentagon to forget about the Azores, which are not of much strategic importance any more anyway, . . . we could take a different stance in Africa," a U.S. official told the *New York Times* African correspondent in Nairobi during Secretary Rogers' recent trip. The U.S. base in the Portuguese Azores has repeatedly been cited as the principal reason why Washington over the years has been reluctant to adopt a stronger policy in support for nationalist forces in Portuguese Africa.

However, an examination both of the evolution of U.S.-Portuguese relations since the Second World War and of changing strategic considerations suggests that if the Nixon Administration were seriously interested in re-examining its low-profile African policy, the Azores should no longer be regarded as an obstacle. Indeed, there is much to indicate that some Ameri-

can officials have already begun to minimize their importance.

From 1946 to 1961 the U.S. maintained a military presence in the Azores on an informal basis. Then, in September 1951, a formal agreement was signed granting the U.S. access to the Azores in time of war for the duration of the NATO treaty. Portugal would have to quit NATO (giving one year's notice), therefore, to deny the U.S. a legal basis for wartime use of the Azores. In peacetime, the agreement gave the U.S. the right to maintain and improve military facilities on the Azores for five years, after which Lisbon could demand the evacuation of all U.S. personnel on six months' to one year's notice.

After lengthy negotiations in 1957, this agreement was renewed until December 1962.

The Kennedy Administration's efforts to adopt an anti-colonial stance in 1961—the year of the Angolan nationalist uprising and India's seizure of the Portuguese enclave of Goa—precipitated a crisis in U.S.-Portuguese relations. During the spring of 1961, in the wake of brutal repression by Lisbon of Angolan up-

risings, the Kennedy Administration voted for United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling upon Portugal to prepare Angola for independence. At the same time, it sought unofficial ways of helping African nationalists and refugees. In December 1961, the U.S. voted for Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling upon Portugal to comply with UN policy against colonialism, and proposed a UN inquiry into the situation in Angola. When India seized Goa in the same month, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated simply that the U.S. "deeply regrets India's use of force." This was in marked contrast with John Foster Dulles's statement in 1955 describing Goa as a "Portuguese province."

Lisbon's accumulated grievances over Kennedy's policy finally erupted in early 1962. The Portuguese Ambassador to the UN declared in February: "Ever since the United States began voting against Portugal in the United Nations, there has been a strong feeling among certain elements in Portugal against renewal of concessions granted. . . in the Azores."

Rusk visited Lisbon in June 1962 to obtain consent to resumption of negotiations on renewal of the Azores agreement. The final result, however, was not that achieved in 1957. Lisbon simply allowed the agreement to expire in December, and announced in early January 1963 that the U.S. could remain in the Azores. This meant that Lisbon retained the right at any time to demand U.S. departure from the Azores on six months' notice. The strategy was clear: rather than require the U.S. to leave immediately and thereby lose its leverage over American policy in the UN and elsewhere, Portugal would allow the Americans to stay so Lisbon could maintain its control over the direction of U.S. policy on the Portuguese colonies. This strategy would be effective as long as U.S. military planners considered the Azores base indispensable.

It was clear that U.S. strategists *did* view the Azores as indispensable during the period from 1961 to 1963. Historian Arthur Schlesinger has written that in the summer of 1961 the "Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the Azores base essential to American

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security in case of trouble over Berlin." In the summer of 1963, Schlesinger says, Kennedy decided to pursue a less active policy on Portugal's colonies at the fall 1963 session of the General Assembly, for fear of losing the Azores. He was due to present the Atomic Test Ban treaty to the Senate that summer and did not want to present the Republicans with the chance to accuse him of endangering U.S. security should Salazar decide to throw the Americans out.

The U.S. voted against a General Assembly resolution in December 1962 calling for a ban on the sale of arms to Portugal, and abstained the following year when a similar resolution was voted by the Security Council. The U.S. representative explained that although the U.S. found much of the resolution acceptable and had for "a number of years" provided no arms to Portugal for use in its "territories," it would not support the resolution because it did not encourage a "needed dialogue between Portugal and the Africans." Since 1968 Washington has continued to abstain on or vote against all UN resolutions on Portugal's colonial policy. This has not simply been a response to a continued Portuguese threat on the Azores. The U.S. could not vote for General Assembly resolutions deploying NATO military aid to Portugal for use in the territories, for example, without admitting what it has officially denied all along—that military aid from the U.S. and other NATO powers has been diverted by Portugal to her colonies.

By all accounts the strategic value of the Azores to the U.S. has been declining steadily since the early 1960s when nearly 80 per cent of all U.S. military transport en route to Europe refueled there. Owing to the development of longer-range aircraft, U.S. strategic and transport aircraft no longer need a stopping point in the Atlantic. U.S. officials explain that the role of the Azores in defense planning has shifted basically from air transport to naval reconnaissance in recent years.

It has been argued that the Azores and the Portuguese African territories have taken on an enhanced strategic significance in view of the deployment of a large Soviet fleet in the Mediter-

anean, the closing of the Suez Canal and the growing interest of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. But a number of military analysts hold that U.S. strategic thinking for the 1970s relies much less than in the past on key pieces of real estate scattered around the globe. U.S. military planners are more interested in ways of moving men and materiel rapidly to areas of potential conflict. They regard foreign bases as desirable, but no longer as essential, and view with comparative equanimity the recent losses and planned cutbacks in U.S. bases throughout the world. This thinking lies behind the unwillingness of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations—to say nothing of Senator Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee—to pay the \$700 million price which Spain is reported to have asked at the end of 1968 for a five-year renewal of U.S. base rights. The Spaniards eventually had to accept \$50 million for a two-year renewal. The reluctance of Congress—and particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—to support expensive foreign base arrangements has not been lost on the Portuguese. Nor has it been lost on U.S. military and diplomatic officials, who have said that if Portugal raised the price for allowing a continued American presence in the Azores, a withdrawal would be considered.

Not only is this a clear indication of the value U.S. officials now place on the Azores. It also suggests that the leverage which Portugal can exert today over U.S. policy is much reduced.

Aside from the Azores, Lisbon's contributions to the evolving bargain with Washington—and NATO as a whole—have been very small.

Portuguese armed forces have never been expected to play anything but a minimal role in the defense of the NATO area. It is well known that Portugal has diverted between two-thirds and three-quarters of its armed forces to the colonies, retaining enough at home only for necessary internal security purposes. In 1962, for example, Portugal's armed forces totalled 80,000 men—of whom about half were in Mozambique and Angola. Two army divisions earmarked for NATO use in time of war were lo-

cated in Portugal, but both units were far below full strength.

By 1969, Portuguese armed forces had risen to 182,000 men, with some 130,000 in Africa. With the exception of some NATO-assigned submarine-detection aircraft, the entire Portuguese Air Force was in the colonies. One army division was earmarked for NATO duty in time of war, but it was at about 50 per cent strength.

Most of the arms and training Portugal has received is of little relevance to any conceivable scenario for NATO's defense. Similarly, the Portuguese Navy—made up of U.S., French and German-built destroyers, patrol ships, and minesweepers—is more useful for the various anti-rebel patrol missions along the Mozambican and Angolan coasts and in Guinea's many inlets than for anything that NATO could have had in mind.

These observations give the lie to the oft-repeated official NATO position that military assistance provided to Portugal was only for use in the NATO area. Official spokesmen have painted themselves into a curious corner: they acknowledge that Portugal's primary military efforts are concentrated in the colonies but insist that weapons supplied to her have remained in Europe.

Through 1961, the main price Washington paid for access to the Azores and for Portugal's marginal role in NATO was a massive program of military assistance and training. During the 1961 crisis caused by Kennedy's anti-colonialism, U.S. military assistance dropped off sharply and has never returned to its previous level. After Kennedy capitulated to Salazar's blackmail on the Azores, Washington-Lisbon relations slowly rose from the nadir reached in 1961; but the nature of the relationship changed. U.S. economic assistance to Portugal partially took the place of a declining flow of military aid, and Portugal shifted to France and West Germany for its major supplies of weapons (see p. 10). In addition, Washington supported Lisbon in the United Nations by voting against or abstaining on resolutions condemning Portugal's colonial policy. The rapprochement in the late 1960s was solidified by the low priority Washington (preoccupied with Vietnam) ac-

corded to its African policy; the minimal flow of U.S. economic aid to African states bordering the Portuguese-controlled territories could only be viewed with satisfaction in Lisbon.

Since January 1951, the basic agreement covering U.S. military assistance to Portugal has been the Mutual Defense Assistance agreement, which expressly stipulates that "assistance received" is "for the purpose of promoting an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area," as defined in the NATO treaty. "Neither government, without the prior consent of the other, will devote assistance furnished to it by the other government to purposes other than those for which it was furnished."

Through the fiscal year 1961, Portugal received \$288.5 million in arms and military training under this agreement. The flow of grant military assistance has diminished considerably since 1961, but it has not disappeared entirely, amounting to a total of \$34.7 million in the 1961-1969 period. Projected figures for fiscal 1970 are in the \$1 million range. Sales of military equipment to Portugal under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales program totalled \$7.4 million from 1962 through 1969. Over grant military assistance or sales to Portugal do not tell the whole story, however. In 1965, for example, the CIA delivered some 20 B-26 bombers to Portugal—a bizarre episode which only came to light when one of the planes flew over the White House and a trial was subsequently held in Buffalo.

Military training of Portuguese military personnel in the United States and Portugal totalled 2,288 through 1963 and 205 from 1964 through 1968. In 1963, 133 Portuguese received training under the military assistance program; a similar number are being trained in 1970. To administer military assistance, sales and training in Portugal, the United States maintains a 24-man Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal.

It has frequently been reported that Portuguese tactics in the colonial wars follow closely U.S. tactics in Vietnam. There is a widespread use of the "strategic hamlets", defoliation of the countryside, and "search and destroy" missions using helicopters

and napalm. It is not clear, however, where the Portuguese have acquired these skills—from U.S. instructors, U.S. Army manuals, or even from press reports of the Vietnam war. The Guinea (Bissau), Angolan, and Mozambican liberation movements have repeatedly maintained, using evidence they claim to have received from captured Portuguese soldiers, that U.S. instruction has played a key role.

The Pentagon claims that only five Portuguese soldiers have ever received training at the U.S. Army's main center for counter-insurgency training, Fort Bragg, North Carolina—which may only mean that other Portuguese have received counter-insurgency training elsewhere—in the U.S. or in Portugal under U.S. instructors. It is interesting that according to the center's newspaper *Veritas*, Col. W. L. Hinton, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, was reassigned to the Army's language school at Monterey, Cal. in January 1970, to learn Portuguese for later assignment in Portugal.

By the mid-1960s it was clear that Washington's retreat from the activist anti-colonialism of 1961 was beginning to pay off in improved relations with Lisbon. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, in a December 1966 press conference summing up the General Assembly's vote on the resolution condemning Portugal, expressed considerable satisfaction that the United States voted against the resolution. The U.S. voting pattern in the United Nations therefore came to represent an acquiescence in Portuguese colonial policy. One U.S. official has said that U.S.-Portuguese relations have been evolving satisfactorily because "we have shown an understanding for their problems in the overseas territories." Other factors aiding a return of U.S.-Portuguese relations to "normalcy" were the Vietnam war and the growing domestic crisis in the United States. Both worked to prevent Washington from taking any new departures and relegated Africa to its traditional place at the bottom of U.S. foreign-policy priorities.

Portugal, of course (along with



South Africa and Rhodesia), has been a chief beneficiary of Washington's declining willingness or ability to develop an African policy. It continues to be in Lisbon's interest for the U.S. to regard Africa with "benign neglect." The worst scenario for Lisbon's point of view would be for an Administration in Washington to take a strong anti-colonial policy at a time when there was no readily available high card like the Azores to play. The paradox is that in 1961, when Kennedy appeared prepared to force the issue over the Portuguese colonies, the Azores were regarded as a valuable piece of strategic real estate, and Kennedy was forced to back down. At present, when the Nixon Administration is reluctant to take any but the most tentative steps, the Azores have only a marginal value.

It is Lisbon's fervent desire therefore that the U.S. military remain in the Azores indefinitely, and that the Pentagon will discover a new reason to make the base "indispensable" so that Portugal will again have a card to play if an American President decided to re-examine U.S. policy towards Africa. For example, the Pentagon might opt to build a Polaris submarine base in the Azores as a backup for the Rota base in Spain which Washington may lose if the current negotiations with Spain for renewal of the base agreement are unsuccessful. If such a decision is in the offing, it is to be hoped that it will be examined closely by Congress and the public, lest the U.S. commit itself to underwriting morally another 20 years of Portuguese colonial policy. As things stand at present, it is clear that strategic considerations can no longer serve as an excuse for U.S. acquiescence in Portugal's rule.

PROFILE Amilcar Cabral

PRAGMATIC REVOLUTIONARY SHOWS
HOW AN AFRICAN GUERRILLA
WAR CAN BE SUCCESSFUL

By David A. Andelman

It is always dangerous to attribute the success of a revolution to a particular battle, to a particular action or philosophy or even to a particular individual. But the history, character, and even success of the revolution in Guinea (Bissau), it is safe to say, are very largely due to the force and the personality of one man—Amilcar Cabral. It is this one man's concern for his people which has made them such determined guerrilla fighters, and his vision of a new nation which has made large numbers of his followers literate and fed and clothed many made homeless by Portuguese repression.

Above all, his single-minded determination transformed a small group of anti-Portuguese dissidents in the mid-1950s into the effective political-military force which today controls nearly two-thirds of the rural area of a country of just under 15,000 square miles with a population of 600,000.

Amilcar Cabral was born 45 years

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ago in Portuguese Guinea of Cape Verdean parents. Even today he regards the liberation of Guinea (Bissau) and the Cape Verde Islands about 600 miles off shore as a joint undertaking, as the name of his organization, the African Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), indicates. He attended university in Lisbon, and returned to Africa as a Government agronomist in Angola and Guinea.

At the time he returned to his native land and first formulated his ideas of revolution for his country, Cabral was one of only 14 Guineans who had attended universities and one of only three-tenths of one per cent of the entire population which was literate, after four centuries of the Portuguese "civilizing mission." This fraction of a percent was made up almost entirely of *assimilados*—Africans or people of mixed ancestry who had become, in effect, Portuguese—accepting the Portuguese way of life and Portuguese political rule (and the inferior station which accompanied it). But Cabral was unlike the bulk of the *assimilados*, who generally wound up as minor civil servants and

were used as showpieces for the efficacy of colonial rule. He served the Portuguese for a while in name but was never one of them in spirit.

Some time before 1956, when his political organization first took formal shape, Cabral began gathering trusted friends round him and privately preaching the need for revolution. He did not have much trouble winning friends and followers. Although short and rather slim, Cabral exudes forcefulness and authority. He has piercing eyes and a bold chin set off by a thin ring of salt-and-pepper beard, and even in his sometimes halting English (learned, in his own phrase, "on the road") expresses his views with a powerful rhetoric. He is fluent in Portuguese, French and Spanish, as well as the Creole dialect which is the *lingua franca* of the movement.

Cabral himself might be called an intellectual; but from the beginning of his organizational drive in 1955-56, he has carefully avoided any tendency to give intellectuals, as such, leadership in the movement (see Book Review section, page 36).

"There is no division between them [intellectuals and non-intellectuals]," he said recently. "Everyone who joins the fight must accept a cultural conversion and recognize that there is an African culture, and this is what must be preserved. There are some people who have not yet totally accepted our principles. We are all fighters and we must fight on all fronts."

"The most important thing is to train cadres. We refuse to have a student organization based on force. Students work for the party. Some of them stay in other countries, but they are responsible for work for our party. Students in other countries work for the party by organizing students in their countries. Medical students are obliged to return during the holidays to our country. They must respect the work of all the people in the movement."

In the four years from 1956 through 1960, Cabral set up the political structure that would operate during his years of exile in Guinea (Conakry), Senegal and Morocco.

"At first we created guerrilla units with a great deal of autonomy, and also some rather ill-defined liaison groups, but we found that each group

wanted to be linked directly to the central organization. They tended to ignore each other. So we had a conference and then we threw out some people. We set up a political committee to lead the war. We created regions. We organized the first units of the regular army, and sent some of the most experienced guerrillas to spread the battle to the most difficult areas."

In 1959, Cabral had decided to try peaceful coercion as a means of obtaining independence. The Portuguese use of massive force to crush a dockworkers' strike in Bissau in that year was decisive in prompting the movement to change its tactics.

"In the beginning we thought it would be possible to fight in the towns, using the example of the experiences of other countries," Cabral said, "but that was a mistake. We tried strikes and demonstrations, but after the massacre at Bissau we realized this would not work. The Portuguese hold us by force of arms. There is no choice; we must do the same." What happened at the Bissau docks finally convinced Cabral that he must leave the country, create a guerrilla organization and then return to concentrate on armed action and political organization in the countryside.

Cabral and his followers chose Conakry as their headquarters, and began their political training. The instructors in this "school for guerrilla politics" were Cabral and some of his chief aides. Beginning in 1960, some 1,000 people traveled there from the villages and towns of Guinea (Bissau) for one to three months of indoctrination in Cabral's pragmatic philosophy of guerrilla war.

"One of our fundamental principles is that the fight must be based on massive support in the countryside," he said. "The people of the Cape Verde Islands recently rebelled. This would not have been possible three years ago, but now it is. We organized both men and women, though at that time we did not call the women to the guerrilla bases. But now women are in charge of some of the main aspects of the struggle. Since 1962 we have moved more than 200 years in this and other matters."

Cabral feels that men and women must play an equally central part in

both the political and military aspects of the guerrilla movement, in preparation for their roles in the new nation which he believes is emerging from the struggle.

"The armed struggle is very important," Cabral told a group of about 150 guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea in 1966, according to French journalist Gerard Chaliand (see "Book Reviews," p. 34). "But the most important thing of all is an understanding of our people's situation. Our people support the armed struggle. We must assure them that those who bear arms are sons of the people and that arms are no better than the tools of labor. Between one man carrying a gun and



Amilcar Cabral

another carrying a tool, the more important of the two is the man with the tool. We've taken up arms to defeat the Portuguese—but the whole point of driving out the Portuguese is to defend the man with the tool."

Cabral has undoubtedly become a first-rate resistance fighter. He speaks knowledgeably of the makes and types of NATO arms which he claims the Portuguese are using against the guerrillas (see "Arms and the Portuguese," p. 10). And although he spends some time traveling to other countries seeking support, he talks proudly of the time four years ago when he was first able to move his headquarters inside Guinea (Bissau).

The fact that Cabral has never appointed a chief of staff to run the

military side of the campaign is indicative of another aspect of his personality—he refuses to allow any of his men to undertake any tasks or dangers he himself would not accept.

The Portuguese has charged that Cabral formed pro-Communist or pro-Chinese alliances during his years of exile. Cabral denies this.

"We are entirely independent," he says. "True, at first we accepted some assistance from some Eastern countries—but that was only in the very beginning. We simply wish to form a government that represents our people."

It was also during those years of exile that Cabral united his fellow resistors behind him. By the time the armed struggle was ready to begin in earnest, Cabral had managed to unite behind him, destroy or render inoperative other liberation groups.

"We consider that we are the struggle now," Cabral said. "Our organization controls nearly two-thirds of the country, we set up the schools, the political framework, trained the people to use the land."

"Our structure changes and adapts to the fight. We call ourselves 'armed militants.' There is the Council of War—seven people drawn from the PAIGC Political Bureau. (Cabral is president of the Council). Each of the battlefronts—north, south and east—has some autonomy, but all follow the Council of War's plans."

As the struggle to liberate and "politicize" the country has gained in strength in the last several years, close associates say Cabral too has gained increasing confidence in himself and his movement. He speaks with enthusiasm of the moment "some time ago" (for security reasons he refuses to say exactly when or where) when he was able to move the main body of his organization and his family back into Guinea (Bissau). For years, his wife and four children lived in exile in Rabat, Morocco.

"Now we have a stake in our country," Cabral recently told me, leaning forward eagerly, his eyes flashing. "We control two-thirds of our country and we are proud of the new state we have created there. We are governing ourselves. Now all the people in our party are inside our country—we are with our people again."

Cahora Bassa hydro project

PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AFRICA SEEK POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GAINS FROM JOINT INVESTMENT

By Prof. William A. Hance

Large-scale hydroelectric schemes and river-basin projects frequently stimulate a greater flow of electricity or irrigation water, and the Cahora Bassa scheme on the Zambezi in Mozambique is no exception. Various observers have written that it will "dwarf the Kariba and High Dam schemes," "provide the cheapest power available in Africa," and "make the economic situation . . . the epitome of stability."

Analysis of the project is difficult because most of the technical studies are not public, negotiations and contractual arrangements are secret and incomplete, and knowledge of the full potential of the basin must await additional studies and trials. Besides, there are in fact two distinct though interlinked projects, the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme and the Zambezi Valley Development Project (ZVDP).

The Cahora Bassa dam will be constructed in the 60-mile Kebrabassa Gorge on the Zambezi River about 80 miles upstream from Tete in west-central Mozambique. It is principally

intended to create a head for the hydroelectric plant, but will also help to even the flow of the river and permit a larger production of firm power throughout the year. The Kariba Dam, between Zambia and Rhodesia, further helps to regularize the flow of the Zambezi's main stream; but by the time the river enters the Kebrabassa Gorge its volume has nearly doubled and it again has a marked seasonal rhythm.

Though access is difficult, the narrow gorge provides excellent site features for the arch-dam wall dam, which will be about 550 feet high and 984 feet long at the crest. Cahora Bassa will be cheaper and easier to build than Kariba; it is nowhere near as massive as the High Dam at Aswan, but it will control a greater flow and eventually permit a greater output of electricity.

The project is planned in three phases: the first, begun in late 1969 and scheduled for completion in 1975, includes the dam itself and a south-bank 1.2 million kw. power station plus two 850-mile high-voltage lines to Pretoria, where it will be connected and fed into the South African grid

system; the second phase would increase the capacity to two million kw., and the third would see the installation of a north-bank station, the construction of two or three dams with generating facilities below Cahora Bassa, and new transmission lines, the total capacity to be four million kw. Still later, additional dams might be placed on some of the tributary streams. The Cahora Bassa scheme is concerned solely with electric power, and it is the agreement by the South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) to purchase large blocks of power that makes it economically feasible.

Portugal called in 1967 for bids which required the successful consortium to provide all engineering works, and also arrangements for financing. In July 1968, Zamco, a consortium organized by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa with French, German, South African, and Swedish concerns was selected with a bid of \$246 million for the first phase. Final contracts were not signed until September 1969—and on the same day, the Swedish ASEA (included because of its expertise in a long-distance, direct-current transmission system which was expected to cost about 30 per cent less than the more common alternating-current alternatives) withdrew on the ground that it feared prosecution under Sweden's new laws on sanctions against Rhodesia, which would probably supply cement, foodstuffs and other items to the consortium. It is thought that ASEA may be replaced by the West German firm of Siemens, though English Electric, which has swap arrangements with ASEA, may receive a subcontract. The delay in completing the agreements is thought to be caused by Portugal's desire to secure greater U.S. and British involvement in order to offset South African influence—and hopefully also to gain greater support from these countries for the Portuguese presence in Africa. The estimated cost of the three stages is \$493 million.

The capital costs per kilowatt installed at Cahora Bassa compare very favorably with those at the Owen Falls, Kariba or Volta dams. On the other hand South Africa will not get

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exceptionally cheap power from the project, despite numerous statements to the contrary. In fact Pretoria has apparently agreed to take power at a price equal to or slightly above the cost of power from its newer large carbocoelectric plants. It has also agreed to lend Portugal money to cover any deficit in the first four years, up to a maximum of \$49 million, to be redeemed in 25 years.

South Africa is interested in Cahora Bassa for both economic and political reasons. Its booming economy is reflected in a doubling of electricity demand in the last decade and comparable increases are projected over the next two to three decades. But the scheme could also represent an important step in Pretoria's current efforts to redirect its external relations away from its earlier introspective isolation. Cahora Bassa fits into this policy because South Africa will become a key customer and aid its neighbor without direct grants, and because the scheme could eventually be the basis for a grid system to all the surrounding states.

The Republic did have to consider a number of possible disadvantages. Foremost was the problem of security, since FRELIMO has promised to harass the project. It has apparently been concluded, however, that this threat can be contained. Reports both of strong guerrilla activity in the Tete area and of the presence there of two battalions of South African troops appear to be exaggerated. Nor does South Africa appear to be particularly concerned about the possible accession to power in Mozambique of an African government. Experience elsewhere has shown that changes from colonial status to independence have not terminated existing economic relations, and it is thought that an African Mozambique would elect to continue the country's important ties with South Africa.

A second and related concern was that South Africa should not become dependent on a foreign source for too much of its electricity; but in fact, its share of Cahora Bassa's capacity will be only about 8.7 per cent of ESCOM's needs by 1980 and roughly half that by 1990. A third concern was that expenditures which could be made domestically would be made

abroad; the weight of this point is reduced by foreign capital participation, expectations that about 30 per cent of total construction expenditure will be made in the Republic, and the knowledge that South African investors would share in the profits.

Portugal also sees political as well as economic benefits in the Cahora Bassa project. Political gains would accrue from greater economic strength in Mozambique and from the presumed interest that investors would have in sustaining the Portuguese presence there. Some accounts claim that Lisbon also hopes eventually to attract a million white settlers to the Zambezi Valley. Whether this is an official goal is unclear—but judging from other efforts to draw settlers from Portugal it is not likely to be successful and might well have an adverse effect on stability because of its patent neglect of the needs of an expanding African population.

From the economic standpoint, Portugal sees Cahora Bassa as the means of developing a large and potentially very rich part of Mozambique. The scheme is also expected to bring valuable hard currency to the central bank in Lisbon. The availability of a substantial amount of low-cost power may stimulate various types of development within Mozambique itself, but it is not likely that all of the available surplus power will be absorbed. There are therefore likely to be strenuous efforts to sell power to Malawi and Rhodesia, and South Africa might also be offered amounts beyond what it has already guaranteed to take. An immediate benefit to Mozambique will be the employment of perhaps 2,000 Europeans and 5,000 Africans during the construction phase.

The greatest potential benefits to Mozambique come through the impact of Cahora Bassa on other developments in the Zambezi Basin, to be managed under the ZVDP. A "starting plan" of indeterminate duration calls for the expenditure of \$176 million, of which about half would be for agriculture, a third for power, and the rest mainly for transportation, social services and community development. Cahora Bassa will provide flood control for a large acreage and permit eventual irrigation of as much as

three million acres. Plans call for irrigating 200,000 acres, principally of sugar and cotton in the first phase, and for developing 75,000 acres to produce food crops, citrus fruit, and beef. There will be some loss of land under the lake created by the dam and about 24,000 Africans will be displaced (nothing is known regarding resettlement plans). The ZVDP also calls for exploiting 500,000 acres of existing forest lands and for planting an equal acreage of exotic timbers which might support a cellulose industry north of Tete.

A variety of minerals are known to occur in the Tete District, but only coal is mined at present. There is talk of exploiting a 200-million-ton reserve of iron ore for an iron and steel mill near Tete, but the metallurgical qualities are little known, and the presence of hydroelectricity is not necessarily the best reason for selecting a site for steel production. A possibly more viable use of Cahora Bassa power would be in an aluminum smelter with bauxite coming from Mt. Manje in Malawi. Output of other known minerals is not necessarily related to the availability of low-cost power, but may be helped by improvements in the district's infrastructure. Cahora Bassa will bring a number of improvements to transportation in the Zambezi Valley. The construction phase will require the building of 106 miles of paved road from the railhead at Moatize and seven bridges in the Tete-Cahora Bassa area, including a bridge across the mile-wide river which will also benefit transit traffic between Malawi and Rhodesia.

Regularizing the river's flow will improve navigation over a 186-mile stretch in the lower course, which is at present navigable as far as Tete in high-water periods but for less than 100 miles at low water. Silting limits use of the delta port at Chinde, but plans call for digging a five-mile channel capable of taking 40,000-ton vessels to a new port at Cuama. The lake above the dam should support a sizeable fishing industry.

There is little doubt that the Cahora Bassa project is economically viable, but the ZVDP contains several elements unrelated to the dam, and others which are not likely to reach fruition for many years.

DIALOG:

SOUTH AFRICAN JEWS AND POLITICS: ANOTHER VIEW By Henry Katsew

Leslie Rubin's *Dialog* on "South African Jewry and Apartheid" (*Africa Report*, February 1970) is that of a moral preacher. Moral preachers have a way of losing touch with reality and of becoming shallow. This is what has happened to Prof. Rubin.

South African Jews as a group (and that was what Prof. Rubin was talking about) have three approaches open to them. They can fight apartheid tooth and nail; they can declare themselves morally neutral; or they can think aloud, honestly, but without heat.

Rubin, as a South African senator, fought the Government and apartheid tooth and nail. Today he is in exile. He has written himself off as a contributor to the search for the answers his baffled country must find if it is to be spared conflagration.

Moral neutrality is not manly, and it is certainly most un-Jewish. The South African Jewish Board of Deputies, the representative body of South African Jewry (or so it describes itself), has been both unmanly and un-Jewish. It found an escape clause: individual Jews are free to express whatever view they please, but the Board itself refrains from comment on Government policy (see Letters page). This means that the Board is neutral on the manifest wrong done to the Africans, Asians and coloreds.

But it is wisdom in South Africa not to mount any moral perch. The dilemma of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies should be viewed realis-

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tically. A rebel white group in the South African situation is just not realistic. We are talking not about paragons, but about people: prosperous businessmen, lawyers, doctors, entrepreneurs, academicians, speculators and all the others who make up a solid upper-middle or wealthy class. Rubin is incredibly naive in seeking from a body composed of such Jews and speaking for such Jews, a tooth and nail opposition to the Government. Things don't happen this way. However, if South African Jews are not paragons, neither are they "a crooked and perverse generation." I do not know where Rubin gets his "reports of increasing support for apartheid by South African Jewry." Most of South Africa's Jews have customarily supported the milder apartheid of the main Opposition, the United Party. Their hearts have not hardened.

The heart of the matter is that in this land of apartheid the Jewish community has not been able to find an utterance for itself. Its Board of Deputies justifies its existence by taking upon itself the role of guardian of Jewish survival in South Africa; and it hastens to quote the renowned world Zionist leader Dr. Nahum Goldmann's assertion of the right to be different.

It so happens that this is also the aspiration of the ruling white group, and that this group expresses this aspiration in much the same way: the right of the Afrikaner *volk* or people to survive; its right to be different; its determination not to be swallowed up in a black sea. This aspiration is found throughout Africa. We are all still strongly tribal.

Given this situation, what does Rubin want of the 115,000 Jews of South Africa? That they should propound the melting pot for all but themselves—and one-man-one-vote for a country patently unready for this?

This is one reason why the South African Jewish Board of Deputies has not found an utterance for itself. There is another. You cannot in one breath claim the right of Jews to political power and sovereignty in one corner of the earth (Israel), as South Africa's fervent Zionists do, and in the next breath approve attitudes which seek to take away the same hard-won right from the children of the Boers.

If one concedes the existence of a difficult situation for the Jews of South Africa, only then can we deal with the central moral issue. This is the domination of 20 million non-whites (South Africa's general term, not mine) by three million whites.

This is wrong. This can only lead to disaster. And a Jew has to say so. Not only for his own sake, but for the sake of his fellow Jews, of his fellow whites and of the non-whites also. To the reasons already given why South African Jews have not found an utterance, there is another: the lack of Jewish intel-

lectuals (although there is an abundance of university-trained specialists in all fields).

It dawned on me some 15 years ago as I watched the Jewish Board of Deputies in its convolutions, that like so many Jewish institutions accustomed to see other groups in terms of Jewish public relations and not really warmly and affectionately, it was encountering the obvious difficulty—that of finding the right things to say. To support their fellow-whites would be to affront the non-whites and to show Jews in support of injustice and discrimination. This it could not do. To support the non-whites would be to brook the anger of fellow whites and to be treacherous to those with whom Jews had the closest cultural affinities. This the Board could also not do. So it decided to shut up.

It failed to perceive the base from which it could operate, namely its own Jewish base, a natural starting-point for an attempt to reconcile the right to be different and free with the need to be fair.

“ ”

This became my base. In two books and in 15 years of writing in the *Zionist Record*, I have searched and probed for this reconciliation. I haven't found it—but what I did find was that Afrikaner intellectuals and newspaper editors were reading me. A year ago I received an invitation to write a weekly column for a Government-supporting Sunday mass-circulation paper, saying the things I was saying in my Jewish newspaper. Two other columnists from the “English” group were also invited to contribute to the English pages of this Afrikaans newspaper. We have not gone out of our way to please the Government or the ruling Afrikaner people. We say what we want to say. Leading members of the Government at first demurred at the things we said, but today we have become a habit and are seen as writers honestly trying to make a contribution to South African thinking and trying also, however inadequately, to join in the search for the answers the country must find.

This is the South Africa I know, as against the South Africa presented by Prof. Rubin. My argument is that my approach should have been found by the Board of Deputies, which owns a journal and—from a Jewish base—could have organized symposia and studies and reports-in-depth to gain the ear of thinking men. But once the Board took the view that the Jewish community, in its organization, had nothing to say on the moral issues of the country of which it is a part, it followed that its journal would speak of all things except what mattered, and

meanwhile the search for an answer goes on. In Afrikaans literature the tormented struggle of the Afrikaans people, first against British imperialism and now against the threat of being swallowed up in black Africa, has found the following classic condensation in the words of Van Wyk Louw, their most outstanding writer and thinker:

There are three kinds of situations which we, as Afrikaners, can call folk crises, situations in which our very survival was at issue.

1: If we were militarily overwhelmed (the Transvaal in 1899) or faced with the threat of being ploughed under by British immigration.

2: If a great many of our people should begin to doubt whether we should survive as a folk (purely academic today).

3: If a great part of our folk should come into the danger of believing that we are not obliged to live in neighborliness with our fellow peoples: if they should believe that plain survival is the central issue, not righteous survival.

Van Wyk Louw also wrote: “I believe that in a strange manner, the crisis out of which a folk emerges reborn, young and creative, is this ‘dark night of the soul’ in which it says: ‘I would rather go down than survive by injustice.’”

For pity's sake give South Africa time. We have voices other than those which make headlines in the world press. The United States dodged a South African problem by extinguishing, or nearly extinguishing, the original Indian population; the Australians disposed of the aboriginals; New Zealand created a white majority; Israel, by no initiatives of her own, was relieved of what could have become an Arab majority. It is too late in history to be pontifical, but at least grant that white South Africa has no precedents and examples from the various colonizing stocks from which it derives and that it has to find its own answers.

“ ”

Everyone of us, Afrikaner, British-descended South African and Jew, is a shareholder in the wrong done to our non-white people. I acknowledge it. But we are searching. Our rulers become more clumsy by the day—and harsher. But I ask you to believe that these are the writhings of a small people with a dilemma too big for them. I do not seek patience from African leaders. They are entitled to resent—and to resent bitterly—our discriminatory legislation against men of color and are entitled to fight us tooth and nail. But I do seek patience from those white peoples who could have left us with navigation charts but found such ways of establishing themselves that they are now absolved of the need.

Japan in Africa: commercial payoff

BUSINESS WITHOUT FRILLS
KEEPS RAW MATERIALS
FLOWING TO POWER
INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS

By Don Shannon

Nothing could have made clearer the difference between the American and Japanese approaches to Africa than the simultaneous tours of the continent in February by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and a Tokyo economic mission.

While news dispatches reported receptions for Mr. Rogers ranging from sullen to a little better than toleration, depending on what he was able to offer from a fairly austere money bag, the progress of the Japanese "economic animals" was recorded on financial pages in Tokyo in terms of what trading opportunities they were able to find. Fumihiko Kono, board chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and 26 businessmen and government officials accompanying him, conspicuously carried no giveaways at all.

President Kaunda of Zambia pressed Rogers for U.S. withdrawal of its consulate from Rhodesia and was clearly displeased with the equivocal answer (See "Dialog", *Africa Re-*

port, April 1970). The same question put to the Japanese mission in their nearest approach to a political issue brought an even more equivocal reply: "As long as others are there, we will not be the first to withdraw." But what was obviously not good enough from the American was acceptable from the Japanese, whose principal discussions in Lusaka had to do with taking copper production out of the hands of the two British firms which have monopolized the industry for the past half century.

The only thing resembling largesse came after the Kono mission's departure, when Japanese diplomats and businessmen in Africa began discussing the possibility of a trans-African highway from Mombasa, Kenya's principal port, to Lagos in Nigeria, passing through Uganda and the former French territories of the Central African Republic and Chad. Cautiously avoiding any commitments, the Japanese are frank to admit that their prime interest in such a road would be to increase their access to African raw materials.

President Bokassa of the Central African Republic last year signed an

agreement with Juzaburo Hasegawa, a consultant to the Daiichi Bank and leader of an economic cooperation mission to West Africa, for the development of uranium by Japanese industry. Bokassa is expected to sign a formal agreement when he visits Expo '70 in July.

Uranium is the main interest of the Japan Atomic Energy Industry Council, but other sectors of industry are interested in any mineral resources which can be developed from the virtually unexplored interior of Africa. None of it is useful to Japan unless it can be moved to Mombasa, of course, and it is interesting that the Japanese immediately favored the highway rather than the railroad, which is dear to African hearts but too expensive and inflexible.

The highway project is a classic illustration of Japanese pragmatism, compared with the heavy-footed entry of the other major Asian power in Africa—Communist China. The Chinese have committed themselves to building an incalculably expensive railroad from the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam to Lusaka, under terms which are bound to arouse Tanzania and Zambia's resentment even if the railroad is ever completed—something the World Bank had doubts about. It is interesting that the Bank's president, Robert McNamara, anxious to prove the superiority of a highway after having rejected aid for the "Tanzam" rail project, is understood to have shown interest in the trans-African highway during a Nairobi visit in January.

Characteristically, however, Japan will avoid any appearance of rivalry with Peking, and if the railroad succeeds they will probably ship Japanese-produced copper on it provided the price is right. If the price is not right, the copper could well continue to come through Rhodesia to the port of Beira in Mozambique. Tokyo's Africa policy is to keep all routes open—if "policy" is the right word. Japan's handling of Africa may be classifiable only under the notorious "case by case" system which has been driving western businessmen and diplomats to drink for generations. What can one make of a situation in which Japanese businessmen play golf at

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white clubs in South Africa (one was struck by lightning last year in what anti-apartheid militants might consider poetic justice), and at the same time are courted by black socialist leaders elsewhere in the continent?

It is clear from a cursory glance at the government agencies in Tokyo which deal with Africa that the matter is indeed in the hands of Mr. Kono's Mitsubishi and the other giants of an economy which now ranks second only to the United States in the free world. The Japanese press talks about the trans-African highway in the most candidly materialistic terms.

"The feeling of black African solidarity will be strengthened, and it will become a single-unit export market for Japan," a correspondent for the *Asahi Shimbun*, the nation's largest circulation newspaper, wrote from Dakar. The "political support" which Japan might gain from building the highway (the writer did not specify for what) was listed last among the advantages. Abandoning that line with obvious lack of interest, he got

back to the meat of the subject:—

"It (Japan) can also win priority in obtaining orders for supplementary facilities, such as construction of other highways, motels and repair facilities. Exports of cars and construction machinery to Africa will increase."

In the small section of the Foreign Ministry which deals with Africa—less than 20 men—it is readily apparent that trade governs Japan's relations with the area. A young man with a genuine interest in Africa explained frankly that Japan must accept South African racial discrimination because the white-ruled republic is one of the best sources of iron ore for Japan's ravenous steel industry. Imports from South Africa—more than one-third iron—were \$334 million in 1968, just \$35 million less than imports from all the rest of black Africa. Japan's exports to South Africa were nearly \$170 million, only \$16 million less than the rest of sub-Sahara, excluding the \$439 million worth of exports to Liberia, nearly all in the form of ships bought by foreign owners.

Because of South Africa's growing trade with Japan, a sizable Japanese colony lives in Johannesburg as "honorary whites". In the weird intricacies of South African racial laws, however, awkward situations arise. A recent example was the refusal of an entry visa for a Japanese jockey, reportedly because of the lack of "traditional ties" such as those which permit the entry of Maori soccer players from New Zealand. No official explanation was given, despite protests from South African newspapers. Nor was any forthcoming some days later, when a visa was authorized too late for the Tokyo jockey to accept it.

Japanese newspapers reported this episode as a curiosity, without passion, and the same detachment was displayed by a Japanese diplomat who described his visit to a post office in Johannesburg, where he walked into the white side to buy a stamp.

"The clerk kept asking me what my nationality was, and I refused to say just to see what would happen," the diplomat recalled. "He apparently decided I was Japanese and sold me the stamp."

David de Villiers du Buisson, South African Consul General in Tokyo, denied that any such status as "honorary white" exists in his home country. He said Japanese visitors are treated like other visitors. Reminded that Chinese and other Asians born in South Africa are not allowed to live in white areas or to use public facilities designated for whites, du Buisson replied: "People born in South Africa are subject to national laws; visitors are visitors." But he was unable to explain why the jockey was initially barred, or why a Japanese woman who married a white South African in Japan was refused entry to her husband's homeland. Uncertainty reigns even for officials in situations other than stamp buying, as in a visit last year by a Japanese legislator whose escorts feared that he might be put in the rear of the plane on an interior flight. The South African Ministry of External Affairs showed more public-relations sense than usual in reserving a front seat for the gentleman from Japan.

Like the rest of the industrial world, including the United States, Japanese steelmakers are buying

Africans learn rice-growing techniques from a Japanese instructor



Rhodesian chrome ore through the numerous back doors which have been opened to circumvent the United Nations economic sanctions on the rebel colony. The principal reaction concerning Rhodesia is one of annoyance at the British Government, which—though many British firms cheat—accuses Japan of sanctions violations that require elaborate investigation which must of course, find the accused firm not guilty.

The Portuguese-controlled territories of Angola and Mozambique cause no problems for Japan, which trades freely with them although the Government discourages investment or the extension of credit as in the case of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique. Africa

is a mystery to older Japanese Foreign Ministry men, whose attention focuses so exclusively on Europe and the United States, that not long ago a senior diplomat eligible for promotion to ambassador was speculating idly on the chances of his being sent to Mozambique. Reminded that a sizeable Portuguese army is dedicating itself to the avoidance of such a possibility, the diplomat asked with surprise: "Isn't it independent?"

Young diplomats in the Africa Section, who do know which African territories are independent and which are not, express annoyance at the slow pace of officialdom in contrast to the swift and sure movement of business. Japan, which still has only ten embassies in black Africa (including

the Lusaka embassy opened to coincide with the Kono mission's visit), covers the commercially important places and handles the others on a circuit-rider basis. Thus the Kinshasa embassy represents Japan in six neighboring countries—Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Rwanda and Burundi.

Among the Japanese Foreign Ministry's African enthusiasts, there is more sympathy for radical Africa than for the conservative countries favored by business interests. The Japanese ambassadors in Nairobi or Lagos are treated with indifference—partly because Japan has been noteworthy in these countries only for causing a chronic imbalance of trade. In Tanzania, however, Japan's in-

Japan's African Trade

Unit: \$1,000 U.S.

	EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
	1966	1967	1968	1966	1967	1968
World Trade	9,776,399	10,441,576	12,971,662	9,522,709	11,663,087	12,987,243
Africa (total)	728,678	850,387	939,992	419,930	661,233	839,082
Africa's Share in Japan's Total Trade (%)	7.45	8.14	7.25	4.41	5.93	6.46
Africa (excluding ships to Liberia)	252,930	258,077	286,564	—	—	—
Black Africa*	494,366	584,607	641,714	217,738	297,866	377,226
Africa's Share In Japan's Total Trade (%)	5.06	5.6	4.95	2.29	2.55	2.90

* Excluding North Africa, South Africa and all non-independent areas.

Main African Trading Partners

Unit: \$1,000 U.S.

	Exports to Africa			Imports from Africa		
	1966	1967	1968	1966	1967	1968
South Africa	126,983	156,517	169,812	133,354	267,390	334,587
Zambia	14,366	29,359	29,380	83,832	138,138	168,419
Ghana	17,749	15,510	19,070	16,631	19,274	33,540
Sudan	16,422	12,774	28,273	13,137	17,255	23,196
Mozambique	11,115	15,466	21,788	7,155	16,515	17,676
Uganda	6,390	5,835	12,025	7,818	14,968	25,269
Congo (Kinshasa)	8,012	5,291	19,988	3,887	8,978	14,161
U.A.R.	24,739	10,740	4,843	17,787	19,116	27,081
Tanzania	12,667	9,074	16,329	14,243	11,289	15,880
Kenya	7,370	17,068	5,550	5,561	6,694	22,513
Nigeria	39,573	38,335	13,094	13,671	16,163	14,502
Angola	4,567	9,036	9,938	4,819	10,854	18,220
Libya	12,597	21,406	24,391	272	82	500
Liberia*	322,889	393,314	439,029	16,968	12,262	17,280

26 * Mostly ships registered in Liberia but owned elsewhere.

vement is significant. Tanzania has offered a large tract near Mr. Killmanjaro for industrial development by Japanese business and Japanese volunteer technicians are welcomed. In Tokyo's Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA), Tanzania is the favored African nation, although the entire program is an extremely miserly one.

Complaints by other developed nations that Japan falls grossly short of her capacity in giving aid to the underdeveloped world are most conspicuously justified in Africa. The entire OTCA budget last year was just under \$19 million, to finance both visits by Japanese technicians overseas and the training of students in Japan. This meant that a total of only 36 experts (including one judo teacher for Senegal's police) went to seven black African countries last year.

Of 1,456 students studying in Japan during the year, only 113 were from sub-Saharan Africa and Japanese administrators acknowledge that the Government puts emphasis on the area where its main interest lies—Asia. Asia gets about 80 per cent of the technical aid budget and the Middle East, Africa and Latin America divide what remains.

The emphasis in the distribution of aid falls naturally on English-speaking Africa, not only because technical training is conducted in English as Japan's second language but also because trade with the English-speaking areas has been stronger. As associated states of the European Common Market, the former French territories maintain higher tariffs against Japanese goods, although some—like the Ivory Coast which has a favorable trade balance—have dropped their barriers slightly.

In the end, the effort and interest of Japan in Africa appears almost purely commercial. Prof. Iwao Kobori of Tokyo University, secretary general of the Japanese Association of Africanists, concluded a recent discussion by remarking: "Unfortunately, Japan's interest in Africa is mainly as a place to exploit for raw materials."

The association, which is headed by Hideji Hasegawa, a professor emeritus at Tokyo University, has about 300 members and is largely an academic group.

The other public organization in the field is the Africa Society of Japan, formed by businesses dealing with Africa. It is headed by Shigeki Tashiro of Toray Industries, Inc.,—and it is this organization, of course,



which most strongly influences Government policy toward Africa.

Business interests dictate a policy of minimum private investment and public aid. Total Japanese private investment in Africa is roughly estimated to be no higher than \$200 million. Potentially short of capital, Japanese industry prefers joint ventures with governments or other partners. For instance, the Japanese investment in seven enterprises in Tanzania ranging from cashew nut processing and offshore fishing to the manufacture of blankets is no more than \$20 million. Japanese firms travel light, shying away from major infrastructure costs such as railway or port construction.

Substantial capital investment is confined to extractive mining, and even here the Japanese prefer to provide knowhow rather than cash. The latest example is a subsidiary of Nippon Mining Co., which, in conjunction with the Congolese government has contracted to increase production in the Katanga copperbelt, replacing the monopoly concession held by the Belgian firm, Union Minière. Nippon Mining has sent 150 Japanese tech-

nicians to Lubumbashi and their pay and equipment will constitute its 85 per cent share of an estimated \$75 million investment. Production from the new mines is to begin in 1972. The output will go to West Germany, and in exchange Japan will receive the ore from a German copper mine being developed on the French-governed South Pacific island of Bougainville. Thus both countries will have a new copper source closer to home, and the Japanese will avoid too much involvement with the Congolese Government.

Japanese aluminum producers have also been discussing joint investments with Guinea and Ghana, but are cautious about expense. The Japanese aluminum industry, which is approaching annual production of two million tons, is completely dependent on imported bauxite. Japanese interest in African bauxite stems from the growing desire of its present principal supplier, Australia, to smelt its own bauxite and export finished aluminum products.

Aid figures from Africa are also unimpressive, even though the Japanese define aid as any loan with at least one year's grace period before repayment at interest rates as high as six per cent. Government grants rose from \$500,000 in 1965 to \$2 million in 1968 while loans and private investment fell from \$134.3 million to \$70.6 million, less than seven per cent of the \$1 billion Japan reported as going to the Third World. The loans include \$44 million of yen credits from the Japanese Export-Import Bank to Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria for the establishment of textile factories.

Grants to Africa are confined to the costs of training Africans in Japan and sending Japanese technicians to Africa. Most has been spent on three Japanese technical cooperation centers for light industry in Kenya, Ghana and Uganda, at a total cost of less than \$1 million.

While Japan has emerged as a major trading partner for Africa and a promising market for African raw material exports, Africa has made little impact on Japanese politics or economic life. The Japanese can be expected to continue their commercial approach to Africa, which has yielded generous benefits at limited cost.

What hope for Africa's refugees?

THEIR PLIGHT—A CAUSE AS WELL AS A RESULT OF INSTABILITY—DEMANDS A NEW APPROACH

By Jan van Hoogstraten

Despite occasional press coverage of specific examples (as in the case of Biafra), Africa's refugee problem is one of the least widely publicized and yet perhaps most intractable results of political disturbance in various parts of the continent. Uganda, whose total estimated population is something under eight million, is host to 170,000 refugees from Rwanda, Congo (Kinshasa) and Southern Sudan. Congo (Kinshasa), with a total estimated population of rather more than 16 million, has about 400,000 refugees from Angola, 24,000 from Rwanda, and 33,000 from the Sudan, as well as smaller numbers from other countries. Other countries with large numbers of refugees are Zambia, Tanzania, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the Sudan. The total number of refugees in Africa is unknown, but estimates range from two to four million.

A long-term solution to the re-

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As a result of the political problems in Africa can only be found by solving the underlying political problems. Charity is not enough—an understanding of the root issues and a sense of purpose and direction are also needed. But while this solution is being sought the refugees themselves must be protected. The 1951 U.N. Conventions relating to the status of refugees and to the status of stateless persons are internationally recognized. Within Africa itself, the Organization for African Unity's convention governing specific aspects of the problems of refugees in Africa is under consideration by its member states. This convention covers the right of asylum, voluntary repatriation, the prohibition of subversive activity against a member of the OAU and the provision of travel documents. If the convention is approved, it remains to be seen how effectively it will operate. If a signatory state violates the provisions of the convention, it can be asked to explain why it did not obey the law which it signed, but that seems to be all that can be done. No sanctions are stipulated.

The need for political protection of

refugees in the countries to which they have fled can be a very real one. A political refugee from Ethiopia—and in recent months there have been a few—who finds himself in Tanzania, may well soon discover that his status there as a refugee from one OAU member country to another is in practice very uncertain. If he does not land in prison, he is under constant pressure to go elsewhere, and finds the choice of alternative refuges virtually non-existent. For as long as the relationships between Ethiopia and Tanzania in the political sphere remain cordial, it is not very likely that refugees from one country will be welcomed in the other, despite all the existing treaties and conventions. Needless to say, this state of affairs is by no means peculiar to Tanzania.

Many tens of thousands of refugees from the Southern Sudan, fleeing a mixture of racial and religious oppression which has been responsible for an estimated 600,000 people killed during the last six or seven years, can be found in the countries surrounding the Sudan—that is, Congo (Kinshasa), the Central African Republic, Uganda and Ethiopia. International opinion, which should be the watchdog over such refugee situations, has not been informed of the position in this case and therefore does not exist. As a result, relief work is greatly hampered, and there is little effective check on direct and indirect pressures by the Sudanese Government on the asylum-giving countries (and especially on the Central African Republic) to return the refugees to the Sudan.

The question of pressure for repatriation raises a number of problems. Nobody will have any objections against a strictly voluntary repatriation, but who is to decide what is "voluntary" and guard against coercion? When and where are the voices of the refugees themselves and their chosen or "natural" representatives to be heard? The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) works to assure protection for refugees, but his office, like all intergovernmental bodies, is limited in what it can do.

When refugee students from Africa have been given scholarships abroad (whether by organizations acting on

behalf of host governments, or by governments directly), selection has all too often been based on political expediency rather than on ability. Cold-war competition for future potential leadership crept into the selection process at an early stage.

The United States has a system by which certain categories of foreign students come as exchange students on so-called J-visas which make it mandatory for such students to return to their country of origin or go elsewhere upon the completion of their academic work. A certain time of residence outside the United States is required before such students can return on a permanent basis. This "anti-brain-drain" clause makes sense for non-refugee students. But why on earth have so many refugee-students entered the U.S. on these "dead-end" J-visas while traveling on flimsy, temporary, non-renewable travel documents issued by some African temporary host-government which had and has no intention of taking the refugee back?

There are at present in the U.S. several hundred refugee students from Africa who have completed the study course for which they came. Some of these wish to return to Africa, but cannot return to the country from which they fled. They have a dubious status in the U.S. (if one can call a "Voluntary Departure Status" a status), or no status at all. Often they do not receive a clear statement from the immigration authorities setting forth what is their status and why. What about those other students who flunked or for other reasons saw their educational pursuits (and support) come to a premature end? How many cases of destitution have come to the attention of voluntary agencies, the Cultural Affairs Office of the State Department, the African-American Institute, the American Committee on Africa? There are refugees in the United States forced to run from pillar to post to get a hand-out and failing this, to enter the professional beggar army. [New legislation allows refugee students to apply for permanent U.S. residence if they might face persecution on returning home.—Ed.]

For the legislators to saddle the

U.S. immigration authorities with an insoluble problem is, to say the least, unfair to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), to the ex-students and to the voluntary agencies. It might be said here that the INS has usually given its most liberal interpretation of the law in such cases and has given, within the law, all possible cooperation to students and voluntary agencies in a mutual attempt to avoid extreme hardships. But the U.S. is a large country. Problems of this sort in the larger cities are one thing for INS to handle, but outside and away from the larger center, these refugees can be in grave trouble.

Why is it so difficult for many refugees to return to Africa if they really desire to do so? Why exclude a graduate teacher, a chemist or an engineer, all men with skills badly needed in Africa for positions filled by expatriates? These and other questions were discussed at a conference on African refugees, sponsored by the OAU and others in the fall of 1967, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was decided to establish a bureau which would circulate student dossiers among the member states of the OAU and thus hopefully place well trained refugees in the multitude of openings which exist in African schools and universities. This bureau has so far placed only a handful of refugees and has as yet failed to provide a solution to this problem. Outside bodies do something to help. The International University Exchange Fund in 1968 helped some 700 refugee students from Southern Africa with scholarships in African institutions of higher learning. With governmental and private funds it continues to do excellent work.

But it has not been possible to convince the OAU membership of what has been learned in Europe, Latin America and the United States—that in most cases the immigration of refugee groups or individuals is a distinct advantage to the asylum-giving country. African governments say for example that for the few openings at their university's they should employ their own nationals. Their second preference is frequently for a non-African expatriate whom they can easily send home when they

no longer require his services—which is difficult with an African teacher who has nowhere to go. Besides, it is argued, an expatriate teacher is often supported by development funds to pay for his salary. What funds does the refugee teacher bring along?

At present a great part of the refugee work carried on in Africa is internationally organized—very often outside Africa. The League of Red Cross Societies, based in Geneva sometimes gets deeply involved in the early stages of a serious refugee situation; often as the "operational arm" of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in tripartite agreements in which the host government is the third party. Some observers consider that the league tends to leave the scene of a given refugee operation too soon.

Recently the UNHCR was instrumental in soliciting the assistance of the Lutheran World Federation (which is also based in Geneva) in a tripartite agreement whereby the LWF became the operational partner on behalf of the host government and the UNHCR. To be sure, UNHCR funds play an important role in such an agreement, but considerable and sometimes major funding by the voluntary agency involved is also required. Examples of this are to be found in Zambia and Tanzania. It would be interesting to analyze whether such an arrangement, in which a very close relationship develops between the host government and a presumably independent voluntary agency, leaves enough freedom of action for the voluntary agency to cater to the needs of any individual refugees who may become *persons non grata* in the host country or fall into other difficulties, often of a pan-African political nature.

It is obvious that concentrated assistance from outside Africa remains necessary for a long time to come. But the ultimate solution however lies in Africa itself. It can be found if tolerance, the growing influence of the Organization for African Unity, a greater acceptance of the potential value of the refugee for the country of asylum, and above all a new understanding and refusal to use the refugees as political footballs prevail.

Aid in a new format

IBADAN INSTITUTE
EMPHASIZES
JOINT RESEARCH

By Dr. W. M. Myers

What are the possible short cuts to rapid agricultural development in tropical Africa? The newly established International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, sponsored by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in cooperation with the government of Nigeria, is designed to make the most efficient use of scarce research in the search for answers to problems that are both urgent and complex. It is also an exciting new approach to the vexed question of external aid and transfer of knowhow.

One of the great paradoxes of our age is that though the tropical regions contain potentially arable lands so vast that they may equal the total area now under cultivation in the whole world, a majority of the people living in the tropics are hungry.

A vast increase in agricultural production is needed both to provide food for the rapidly increasing population and to lay the base for economic development. Agricultural modernization and striking improvements in

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yield can be achieved only if traditional farmers switch to different production techniques. Techniques which are generally not available in the tropics, especially in the food and feed crops.

The nature and urgency of the problems can be dealt with only through a massive and urgent research effort in the tropics. Experience in Mexico, Colombia, India, and a few other countries indicates that national research, training and production institutions and programs can be developed and can provide the indispensable research results, provided that they receive the necessary time and resources. However in many poor countries, especially in Africa, the task of producing the scientists and creating the institutions needed to speed agricultural development is only beginning; and while the creation of such national capabilities must be the ultimate objective, the need is too urgent to await completion of this lengthy process.

What is needed is a short-cut response to research that will pay off in knowledge of how to increase the agricultural productivity of peasant farmers. This research pay-off cannot be achieved for the present in many countries owing to the lack of available agricultural specialists. Even if these countries were willing to divert all their scientists to the task, there would not be enough experts to fill the gaps in national research institutions and programs. Hence the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations decided that a major international research and training center was needed to focus on the problems of the tropics.

Ibadan was chosen as the center for African tropical agricultural research because it offers an ecology typical of the area under study, is close to the University of Ibadan and to Nigerian research centers, and provides the physical and cultural amenities needed to attract a first-rate international staff. Trainees at the center will have opportunities for academic studies, and its operations will be closely related to national agricultural development programs.

The foundations proposed, and the Nigerian government accepted, a joint undertaking to establish an International Institute of Tropical Agricul-

ture as a non-profit, philanthropic research and training institution.

The accord between the foundations and Nigeria is an intriguing example of a new approach to aid. The Nigerian government agreed to provide land and certain tax, customs and immigration prerequisites to the institute and its professional staff. The Ford Foundation is providing the capital for site development, buildings and equipment, while Rockefeller and Ford both expect to make funds available annually for the core research and training activities. The Institute has been planned on a scale considerably larger than could be supported solely by foundation money, and negotiations with technical assistance agencies for additional funds are in hand.

Recruitment of staff and construction began in the autumn of 1968, and research was well under way by spring 1970.

The Institute aims to improve food-crop management, crop improvement, develop the soil- and crop-management practices required for a stable, permanent and productive agriculture. Primary emphasis will be on the hot, humid tropics, but research on dry forest and savannah areas is also possible.

The research program will be organized in five major categories: soil and crop production in the tropics and to plant protection, agricultural engineering, and economics. A sixth category, livestock production, may be added later.

While the Institute is expected to have its greatest impact on food production in West Africa, the terms of its charter guarantee its international character. The 11-member board of trustees includes three Nigerians and two members from other African states, two from Europe, three from the U.S. (with Ford and Rockefeller each designating one board member), and one from Southeast Asia. The director of the Institute, the permanent secretary of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, and the vice-chancellor of a Nigerian university with a faculty of agriculture serve as ex-officio board members. The institute is designed to ensure the host government an effective voice in its operation while its activities, staff, and results serve a broader geographic area.

Tennis: Ashe vs. racism

STAR TALKS
ABOUT DAVIS
CUP BAN

By Ida Lewis

South Africa's racial policies have landed her in trouble in the world of sports often enough before now. But events such as her banning from the Mexico Olympic Games and the more recent trouble over the Springboks Rugby football team's tour of Britain (See "Out of Africa", *Africa Report*, April 1970) arose from issues of principle. South Africa's suspension from the tennis Davis Cup at the end of March 1970—which is due to run for a year—stemmed from a much more personal confrontation. Though the U.S. chairman of the committee which decided on the ban said that the refusal of an entry visa to the black American tennis star Arthur Ashe "was not a prime factor" in the decision, it seems clear that it was the specific incident which spurred the International Lawn Tennis Federation's action, even if more general considerations were also involved.

Ida Lewis, Editor of the new magazine "Essence," has written on Africa for "Jeune Afrique," "Life," and numerous other publications.

So, once again, those who still believe that it is possible to "keep politics out of sport" were disappointed. South Africa's application of politically-based racial discrimination to the world of sport inevitably led to politically-based countermeasures. Even if the official ban had not come about, the South African action would certainly have led to reaction within the tennis world. A number of players, including the entire U.S. Davis Cup team, have said that in the light of the rejection of Arthur Ashe, they will not compete in tournaments in South Africa—though other international tennis stars hold that the whole affair is no personal concern of theirs. Ashe himself appeared before the UN Apartheid Committee on April 14, and called for the expulsion of South Africa from the International Lawn Tennis Federation.

When you applied for a visa to play in South Africa, did you in fact believe that there was the slightest possibility of being granted permission to enter that country?

Perhaps I was naive, but I actually thought that I would be given permission to play in South Africa. I was really surprised when my application was turned down.

In view of South Africa's apartheid policy, what gave you the impression that an exception might be possible? The principal fear of the South Africans was that my trip would be political, not athletic. In order to cool these fears I signed notarized statements that my visit wouldn't be political, that I would not make any statements at all while I was their guest. I was sincere, but evidently they didn't believe me.

You have been criticized by militant blacks for even attempting to get into South Africa. What were your objectives in applying for a visa?

I wanted to play tennis in the South African open championship, and to win before a stadium full of whites. Deep down inside of me I know that would have been greatly satisfying to the millions of non-whites who live in South Africa. I also applied for the entrance visa to trigger South Africa's suspension from the Davis Cup competition, if my application was rejected.

Are you satisfied that the Davis Cup committee has suspended South Africa from the competition?

Let me answer your question this way. I would have preferred to play tennis in South Africa rather than have them barred, because to me this would have been comparable to a successful civil rights boycott or the kind of sit-in which was a popular tactic back in the early 60s. Ellis Park in Johannesburg is the counterpart of Forest Hills in New York. I need not have uttered a word against the system for it to have been a victory for the (black) cause.

How did you feel when the news reached you that your application had been rejected?

Oddly enough I was neither bitter nor angry. I was just very disappointed. It would have been a beginning. It would have meant so much to the black South Africans if I had been allowed to play . . . and if I had won. *Would you say that most of the South African players sympathize with your position in regard to apartheid and resent your rejection?*

I would say that I have friends among the South African tennis players who care a great deal about my rejected bid to enter South Africa and who are unsympathetic to the apartheid policy. There are others who don't care one way or the other. Then, there are those who support the apartheid of South Africa. But I have friends, I am not alone.

Do you object to individual South African players—in any sport—competing in the United States?

No, I do not. The ban should be against South Africa as a country—not on individual players. It is the policy of the Government which is the target, not individuals.

What, besides South Africa being banned from the Davis Cup and possibly from the International Lawn Tennis Federation, will be the significance of the affair?

The banning of South Africa from participating in world tennis will be another indication of the world feeling about the policy of apartheid. I don't honestly believe that this single act will have a great effect on South Africa's internal politics, but in my view it is one more step toward her eventual isolation in the world.

THE ARTS:

NEW ART FROM THE PAST: RHODESIA'S CENTRAL AFRICAN WORKSHOP SCHOOL

By Judith von Daler

It is many hundreds of years since any indigenous art has flourished in Rhodesia. The few stone sculptures found among the ruins of Zimbabwe, now housed in the British Museum and in Cape Town, were made in the middle ages. But since the opening of the National Gallery of Rhodesia in 1957 and the selection of Frank McEwen as its director, the Rhodesian art scene has experienced a re-birth. McEwen had spent 20 years in Paris, in close contact with Picasso, Braque, Brancusi and many other modern masters. His earliest exhibits included "Rembrandt to Picasso," a huge Henry Moore showing and a rare collection of medieval French tapestries.

But bringing European art to Africa was not McEwen's sole intention. He also wanted to promote the participation of indigenous people in the arts. One day he met a man sitting by the side of the road, carving a jug out of stone. "Why don't you carve a head?" he asked the sculptor. A few days later McEwen purchased

Judith von Daler is a writer who has specialized in contemporary East and Central African art. She has carried out field work in Ethiopia and the Comoros as well as all three East African countries.

the resultant stone-carving. An art workshop was established at the National Gallery, and two in the bush, at Sipolilo and Inyanga. Word spread rapidly, and hundreds of would-be artists left their jobs as farmers, drivers, miners and musicians to visit the workshops, some traveling on foot from hundreds of miles away.

About 75 artists remained with the workshops from more than 1,000 who had tried their skills. Their styles evolved from vibrant and naive representations to more conscious, mature forms. McEwen visited the three workshops regularly, encouraging promising artists and rewarding outstanding achievements. Thus protected from the ruinous tourist trade, the artists were able to concentrate. Seemingly incredible morphological transpositions emerged as they delved into their ancient traditions, religious folklore and magic for themes which became increasingly pertinent to the deep spirituality of their lives. These efforts were intensified as McEwen promoted and sold their sculptures in the gallery. Large exhibitions were staged in Africa, Europe and the Americas. An art dormant since the middle ages had been awakened.

In the spring of 1968, several hundred Rhodesian stone sculptures were brought to America under the auspices of the

International Council of The Museum of Modern Art in New York. Forty-six works toured the United States in a museum exhibition entitled, "New African Art: The Central-African Workshop-School." Further exhibitions are planned on both the east and west coasts, and a showing of the newest works opens on May 10 at the Museum of Modern Art in Paris.

In search for even greater peace than they could find at the three workshops already set up, some of the best artists are establishing a center 300 miles from Salisbury, on 5000 acres of untouched territory called Vukutu. Vukutu (the name is that of a legendary Shona sage) is a famous region of ancient ancestral graves known in Shona as the "place of the green dove", and thousands of these rare birds still inhabit the area. Here the artists are building houses, quarrying stone, and producing work which shows a staggering advance on their previous efforts. Before deciding to settle on the Vukutu heights, the artists studied the land—its fertility, water, and protection from the winter wind. Most important, they had to discover whether the spirits of the graves would accept their use of Vukutu as an art center. Medium representatives prayed, fasted, slept and studied their dreams there before finally receiving a welcome.

McEwen has witnessed ritual dances and celebrations of deep significance, and been privileged to meet spiritual leaders. He has just completed a film about the life and work of the artists and the background of their ancient and still relatively intact tribal culture. The film also traces the artistic history of Rhodesia from ancient Zimbabwe to the present day.

The leading spirit of the group at Vukutu is Sylvester Mubayi, winner of an important sculpture competition this year. Mubayi, a man wise and able beyond his years, is the great-grandson of a famous hunter who speared lions and leopards in single combat. He is a tower of physical and mental strength who has gained the deepest respect of all who come into contact with him. Other members of the community—and names which may become more widely known in future—are Thomas Mukamberonwa, John and Bernard Takawira, Edom Ndoro, Phinitos Mayo, Simon June and Batom Mpyisi, Joram and Nemiah Marigo and Bernard Manyandure.

These artists are creating works of a sculptural power and dignity that one can find elsewhere only in the periods of great archaic art.



Above: *Skeleton Antelope Man*, by Sylvester Mubayi. Stentite 25 in. Above right: *We Are One*, by Nicholas Mukomberanwa. Black serpentinite, 31½ in. Right: *Spirit Head*, by Phinias Moyo. Dark green crystal rock, 12 in. A gradual change to the use of harder stones, in preference to the green steatite—soapstone—previously favored, is one important development taking place at Vukutu (soapstone is already being industrialized by the "airport" traders, whom the artists are determined to defeat). The stone now used at Vukutu ranges from serpentinite through lepidolite and granite to crystal rock, which is semi-transparent and polishes to a superb finish.

BOOK REVIEWS:

AFRICAN FORMULA FOR REVOLUTION? WHITHER AFRICAN STUDIES? PEASANTS AND PUNDITS

Armed Struggle in Africa by
Gerard Chaliand, tr. by David
Rattray and Robert Leonhardt,
New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969.

Reviewed by Gerald Bender, who
is completing a Ph.D. in political science at
UCLA, having recently returned from Por-
tuguese-controlled Africa.

With guerrilla wars on most continents, there is a temptation to see similarities, draw parallels, and develop, a Régis Debray has, world-wide prescriptions for revolutionary warfare. Gerard Chaliand in *Armed Struggle in Africa* uses the case of Guinea (Bissau) to refute the idea of applying previous guerrilla warfare models, such as those which emerged from the Asian and Latin American struggles, to all liberation wars. He provides us with a succinct anatomy of one African model of guerrilla warfare.

Chaliand is well qualified to write on comparative guerrilla warfare, having observed guerrilla wars on the spot in Algeria, Cuba, Colombia, Jordan and North Vietnam as well as Africa. Although he is a Marxist committed to revolutionary change, little escapes his critical eye and

no one, on the right or the left, is beyond his reproach. In his concluding chapter analyzing the experience and context of armed struggle in Africa, Chaliand exemplifies devotion and frankness, while removing himself from the ranks of "ideological epologists" of the Nkrumah era. He combines direct access to the guerrilla movement with an objectivity that provides us with an excellent insight into a revolution and its catalyst, the PAIGC, which Basil Davidson has characterized as "the most exemplary model of a revolutionary movement in the past 40 years . . ."

Chaliand spent two weeks in the summer of 1966 inside Guinea traveling with the PAIGC (African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands) and its leader, Amílcar Cabral. His observations and analyses of this experience appeared originally in French in 1967, and have now been published in English with a valuable foreword by Basil Davidson.

The armed revolt in Guinea began in January 1963, but the actual revolution began in 1966 with the founding of the PAIGC in Bissau, the capital, by Cabral and his associates. Originally an urban-based and urban-oriented movement, the PAIGC in cells of three to five members directed most of its efforts toward enlisting

support among the working class of river-transport and dock workers. In August 1969, after some 50 dockworkers were killed by Portuguese police during a dock strike in Bissau, the PAIGC decided that armed conflict was the only means of realizing their goals.

In the following month the party began to concentrate all its efforts on mobilizing the rural population for armed struggle against the Portuguese. In the next year, 1960, Cabral established a school in Conakry to train party cadres to return to Guinea's rural areas and begin the work of peasant recruitment. This intensive period of organizing singularly distinguishes the PAIGC movement from not only those in Asia and Latin America, but other African liberation movements.

The PAIGC's military successes and the amount of territory it controls are not as important as the social and political change occurring in these areas. Cabral himself has said: "It means nothing to be in command if we lack schools and hospitals and if we do not manage to change living conditions in the rural areas." Herein lies the principal difference between Guinea (Bissau)'s liberation movement and most others.

Cabral's aim throughout has been the winning of peasant support by providing them with concrete benefits. In 1965 he wrote that "the people are not fighting for ideas—for the things in anyone's head, but to win material benefits." This contrasts sharply with fanon, who saw the absence of ideology as the "great danger which threatens Africa." Cabral also stressed that it is not enough to have the peasants alienated from the Portuguese, they must also see that the Party offers them a better life as well as protection from the Portuguese troops.

Cabral departs from Che and Debray's argument that the Party must be subordinated at all times to the revolutionary army. As a result, more rice is now produced in the PAIGC zones than in the Portuguese-controlled areas, forcing Portugal to import rice for the first time in years. Some of the rice produced in PAIGC areas has even been exported. Furthermore, the PAIGC has established a number of "People's Shops" for trade and distribution of crops produced in the liberated zones. In this way, the PAIGC hopes to cripple the Portuguese economy in Guinea (Bissau) as well as construct its own economic infrastructure.

This process of nation-building in the

liberated areas is being applied in other spheres, such as education. Here, much effort is being expended for the future of Guinea: "We can wage the struggle and win the war" says Cabral, "but if, once we have our country back again, our people are unable to read and write, we will still have achieved nothing." According to one party cadre, student enrollment in the liberated areas amounted to 9,000 in 1966. By 1969 Davidson states this figure had risen to 15,000, which if true is almost twice as many pupils as were enrolled in Portuguese-controlled schools during 1966-67. Finally, before 1961, Guinea had only 14 university graduates while the PAIGC now has trained agronomists, doctors, and nurses actually working in the country.

Another effort of the PAIGC in building a new social structure is to resolve tribal differences within Guinea. Chaliand relates these differences to the problem of recruitment and support of PAIGC. About 70 per cent of Guinea's population is composed of non-Islamic, non-Christian tribes with no systematic tradition of chieftancy and who are primarily subsistence farmers. The remaining 30 per cent are Islamic Mandingo and Fula who have a tradition of chiefs and are actively engaged in commerce and the cash economy. This economic involvement of the Fula and Mandingo plus the fact that the Portuguese established alliances with the Fula chiefs, even appointing them as chiefs over traditionally non-Fula tribes (such as the Balante), have made recruitment among the Fula and Mandingo peoples difficult for the PAIGC. However, tribalism does not appear to be a serious problem among the nationalists. This is partly because the composition of the PAIGC is principally non-Fula and non-Mandingo.

The problems attendant to tribalism are far more serious in Portugal's other two colonies where they not only threaten future stability but presently act as divisive forces among the various nationalist organizations. In Mozambique, Uria Simango, one of the ruling triumvirate which replaced the late Eduardo Mondlane as head of FRELIMO, resigned in November 1969 charging among other things that FRELIMO was "torn by tribalism and regional disputes." In Angola, Holden Roberto's Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) appears to be as suspicious of non-Bakongo as MPLA and UNITA (Angola's other movements) are of the Bakongo. Roce has also been a factor. Some

members of FRELIMO never accepted Mondlane's marriage to a white woman or his policy of not attacking Portuguese civilians. And the presence of mulattos in leadership positions in Angola's MPLA has raised doubts among both GRAE and Savimbi's UNITA.

Chaliand analyzes the significance of PAIGC political and social mobilization both before and after the fighting began in 1963. He weaves the narrative of this period through the words and experiences of the actual participants, such as Chico, the 27-year-old political commissar of the Northern Region. Chico explains the strategy of political mobilization preceding military action, an important and unique factor in PAIGC's success—

"We must first explain our struggle politically and make a precise study of the regional situation, which may or may not be favorable, depending on circumstances. We send in the army only after completing this first task and only if it shows positive results. We prefer to send fighters who were born in the region and who speak its language. . . . After creating a new relationship of forces by virtue of our military action, we have to replace the colonial infrastructure with our own administrative and economic infrastructure, in order to affirm our presence and to take care of the population's elementary needs. . . . Our struggle has been successful because two years before launching the armed struggle, Amilcar trained hundreds of cadres in Canary and sent dozens of them to do the work of explanation and mobilization in the villages. When we began the struggle, we didn't have to hide from the Portuguese and the villagers, because the peasants informed us about every move made by the Portuguese troops. Since then, we have always taken precautions to avoid a split between the fighters and the population."

The absence of such an intense mobilization period in Angola and Mozambique explains the retarded success of their guerrilla movements far behind that of the PAIGC. In Angola, for example, the MPLA attack on the police station outside Luanda in February 1961 and the attacks by Holden Roberto's Union of Angolan Peoples (later renamed GRAE) the following month came as almost as much of a surprise to the African population as it did to the Portuguese. In assessing the accomplishments of the Angolan groups, Chaliand argues that neglect of the necessary political work of winning over the

peasantry is largely responsible for the mediocre achievements (at best) of their eight-year-old war. And in Mozambique, after five years of fighting, FRELIMO has yet to seriously penetrate beyond the liberated Caba-Delgado and Nyasa districts in the north.

The unsuccessful methods employed by the Angolan and Mozambican groups resembles the *foco* strategy of Guevara which worked in Cuba but failed in Peru, Argentina and Bolivia. The initial 'focus' of the struggle attracted some support, but the bulk of the peasantry have yet to actively participate in the revolution even though they may sympathize with the goals of the nationalists.

A comparison of the three revolutions in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) points up the fact that the *foco* theory is based more on a romantic notion of the peasants than on the reality of their situation. In fact, the liberation struggles in Angola and Mozambique demonstrate that *foco* tactics can be counter-productive. Once the fighting started in the latter two territories, the necessary mobilization work became severely restricted by the activities of the Portuguese troops and secret police. In fact, the Portuguese were able to employ methods of counter-insurgency in areas never before contacted by the nationalists. Chaliand argues that Angolan guerrillas, lacking control of the villages, have been "cut off from the people, whom they must avoid as carefully as the enemy." While this fact must now be qualified in light of recent MPLA successes in eastern Angola and in the Cazombo district, basically the point is still true.

Ironically, the problem of enlistment and mobilization in the rural areas should have been more difficult in Guinea than in either Mozambique or Angola, where the Portuguese established large plantations, company estates, and mining areas. Consequently, Guineans did not face land shortages nor were they recruited for forced labor on plantations which caused so much hardship and resentment in Angola and Mozambique. In addition, Guinea's small white population of less than 3,000 is employed in the Portuguese Civil Service meaning less competition for Europeans for African land and markets, as well as a higher proportion of Guineans being employed in the public sector than in either Angola or Mozambique. These factors should have made Angola and Mozambique riper ground for

recruitment and mobilization of disaffected Africans, but the real success in this area is found in Guinea (Bissau).

Revolution in Guinea, An African People's Struggle, by Amílcar Cabral, tr. by Richard Handyside. Stage 1, London. 6 shs [U.K.]. To be published in the U.S. by Monthly Review Press. French from Editions Maspéro, Paris.

Reviewed by Douglas L. Wheeler, Associate Professor of History at the University of New Hampshire, Durham.

The war in Guinea

(Bissau), now in its eighth year, deserves much more world-wide attention than it has so far received. This forgotten war, fought in dank forests and swamps, promises to show how one African territory may win its independence by force of arms, not through anti-colonial pressures in European capitals and at bargaining tables. The Portuguese armed forces in Guinea (Bissau), now numbering at least 30,000, have been losing the war since 1964. Their position has slipped to the point that when the President of Portugal, Admiral Thomaz, recently visited the country, the African nationalists were able to mortar Bissau airport.

As the situation for the Portuguese in Guinea moves into nightmare, what are the prospects for negotiations between the antagonists, and the alternatives open to the Portuguese? No Portuguese leader today, even with a slightly relaxed political situation at home, with reduced enthusiasm for carrying on a hopeless war in Guinea (Bissau) and with rising expenses and casualties, could afford to acknowledge defeat or contemplate immediate withdrawal. Attempting to find a scapegoat for defeat among Portuguese military ranks might well undermine the military section of the coalition which supports the Caetano regime. Even if it seemed to have any prospect of success, an appeal to the United Nations, as in the case of the Indian invasion of Goa in 1961, would appear to be against the traditional Portuguese policy of depending on bilateral alliances (Britain before the Second World War, the United States since) for close support in the clutch.

Portugal has consistently refused to negotiate with the PAIGC, but has dealt to

some degree with smaller, "moderate" parties such as the National Liberation Front of Guinea (FLNG). Would Lisbon hand over political control in Guinea (Bissau) to a more malleable "middle" party, which would then have to deal with the military might of the PAIGC in the end? Whatever the slight room for maneuver, Portugal would have to practise sleight of hand to hide the fact that the traditional concept of "national integrity" in the Constitution of 1933 had been broken, and that a serious crack in the imperial edifice had appeared. As an African military victory appears more likely, Cabral's bargaining position improves; he has publicly stated that the PAIGC sets no timetable on negotiations and will sit down to talk at any time, with the premise of total independence as the major condition.

What are the vested interests keeping Portugal in Guinea, besides the army's reputation and record? While there is not a significant settler factor (fewer than 3,000 in 1962), there is indeed a commercial factor—the Companhia União Fabril, a massive cartel of Lisbon interests which for decades has been a power in high circles in Lisbon. "CUF", as it is called by the Portuguese, virtually owns the modern economic sector in Guinea, but its days of profits and strength appear to be numbered in the expanding, modernizing Portuguese economy. With a larger, more modern middle class coming into its own in Portugal, old-line colonial outfits like "CUF" are losing their lobbying power. However, even though the economic costs of losing Guinea may be small, certainly tiny in comparison with even the mineral potential in Angola and Mozambique, the actual political costs of the publicity and inevitable loss in confidence which would follow a withdrawal will be greater, and less calculable.

Newly available in French and English is a collection of speeches and talks made by Amílcar Cabral, the PAIGC leader, between March 1961 and January 1969. This is an interesting contribution to the tiny shelf of published works in English by Portuguese African nationalists. The PAIGC program, a valuable document for students, is included in the appendix.

There is little structural unity in this book which runs the gamut from brief press conference statements (made on the release of captured Portuguese troops in Senegal in 1968), to extended essays on theory, history and anthropology. What emerges most clearly, however, is the

original thought of Amílcar Cabral, ex-assimilado, descended from Cape Verdeans, and husband to a Portuguese wife. Cabral's sharp mind dominates the book with clarity, forthrightness, pragmatism, and honesty. His task has been to take theory and work it into practice, to overcome technological backwardness, to build a nation out of a congeries of peoples.

Cabral's first major lesson was learned in the struggle to organize support for an independence movement in the towns. He left for the countryside when he got little support from the urban bourgeoisie and workers. Even more discouraging was his discovery that the Guinean peasants lacked revolutionary consciousness. But while the peasants would not fight for an abstraction, they would support Cabral's group for the promise of a better life, of a better material position. The organization of an increasingly mobile army of 10,000 soldiers supported by the peasants in many areas was a triumph of patience, hard work, and pragmatism. It was also a matter of shrewdness, objectivity, sacrifice and not a little personal humility.

This said, it should be acknowledged that Cabral's writings contain bits of dogma, propaganda and doctrinaire nonsense. He is at his weakest—his Marxist worst—when he expounds certain broad theories of causation and explanation. In a speech made in Cairo at the third conference of African Peoples in 1961, he asserted that Portugal survived in late-19th-century Africa largely by becoming a semi-colony of England and in the 20th century as a dependency of "world imperialism." But the best available historical evidence suggests that Portugal's survival in Africa was not due to England's string-pulling, so much as Lisbon's determination to use African profits and prestige as a prop in Europe, and colonialism as a means of national revival during a moral crisis.

While England did provide necessary diplomatic and financial support at crucial moments until after the First World War, since Salazar's Estado Novo achieved power during 1926-33 there has been a steady nationalization (and hence, decolonization) in Lisbon of foreign-owned companies and utilities, and a clear assertion of "Portugal first" in international affairs and economic relationships in Africa and Europe. The major factor has been a strong Portuguese nationalist policy, supported by isolation, increasingly large settler communities (now numbering

together half a million in Angola and Mozambique), some cold-war alliances, and valuable new mineral discoveries.

The Guinea (Bissau) insurgency is so far the most successful case of an anti-colonial action in a temporary post-war Africa. It has caused euphoria among some students who have been led to believe in a kind of colonial domino theory: as Guinea (Bissau) goes, so will go Angola and Mozambique. But the positive evidence of the infectiousness of the Guinea virus is still wanting.

Students of current affairs in Portuguese-controlled Africa should beware of such alluring models after a decade of discouragements. Cabral's important writings would caution us against the use of his country as a universal model for the liberation of Southern Africa: "We can say that our country is very different from other countries." Despite this simple warning, many readers will find some tantalizing lessons written here by the hand of a master revolutionary of our time.

Portuguese Africa: A Handbook, ed. by D. M. Abshire and M. A. Samuels, Praeger, 1969, 480 pp., \$15.00. Reviewed by Stephen P. Heyneman, a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago who taught African history in Malawi in 1967-68 and frequently visited Mozambique.

Abshire and Samuels' work attempts not only to describe, but also to interpret the situation in Portuguese-controlled Africa. But while the authors and editors succeed in the presentation of fact and description, they very often fall short in their interpretations. A handbook is supposed to be descriptive. If it does present interpretive material its analysis should be balanced; and *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* is too often lacking in this balance.

The presentation of factual data is, of course, worthwhile in itself. The chapters on the current agricultural, economic and governmental structures and on the most recent developments in trade, commerce, transportation, mining and labor policy give a meaningful perspective. They portray complexity without becoming myopic, specialization without being firestorm. There are good historical and anthropol-

Oxford University Press



The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960, MEN, METHODS, AND MYTHS

By I. F. NICOLSON, *University of Queensland*. The author examines the administration of the "undeveloped estate" of Nigeria, from the confidently planned beginnings in 1900, through the emergence in 1960 of Nigeria as an independent member nation of the United Nations. The emphasis throughout is on the administrators—what kind of men they were, what they tried to do, their main problems, their success and failures, and some of the consequences of their actions. *Map. (Oxford Studies in African Affairs.)* \$6.25

Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan

A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1899-1956

By MUDDATHIR 'ABD-AL-RAHIM, *University of Khartoum*. The Sudan, the largest country in Africa and the first to achieve independence after World War II, is a microcosm of Africa. Its history, its present problems, its future prospects are in many ways typical of the emerging Afro-Asian countries. This study, the first full-scale treatment of the constitutional and political development of the Sudan, sheds much light on the nature and methods of colonial government, and the interaction between these governments and the movement of liberating nationalism. *Map. (Oxford Studies in African Affairs.)* \$8.75

African Affairs NUMBER THREE

Edited by KENNETH KIRKWOOD, *Oxford University*. Among the selections in this volume on Africa are the following: The Study of Literature in an African University; Federalism and Political Attitudes in West Africa; Current Soviet Theories on State Integration in Africa and in the Homeland; Madagascar, an example of Indigenous Modernization of a Traditional Society in the Nineteenth Century; and Assets of Colour Attitudes and Public Policy in Kruger's Republic. (*St. Antony's Papers, No. 21.*) \$4.50

Accelerating Investment in Developing Economies

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ogical introductions. A final section is devoted to a balanced analysis of the international situation which reaches the gloomy, but perhaps accurate, conclusion that all signs point to an indefinite prolongation of "contained" guerrilla conflict.

The book more than once points out that the Portuguese Africa of today is not the same as the Portuguese Africa of 1960 or 1961, at the beginning of the guerrilla activity. It emphasizes that with the aboli-

tion of the "indigena" status, forced cotton-production and extensive use of the "palmatoria" (a particularly vicious form of corporal punishment), the life of the average African is simply not the same. He is not legally oppressed as he once was, and the Government for the first time in its colonial history has been prodded into serious attempts at providing economic and social changes.

But the important question is not whether

the laws are the same as in 1960, or whether the Government has made attempts at economic and social development, but how meaningful are these laws or the attempts in determining the equality of opportunity. Just as the civil rights movement in the U.S. has passed through the "down with Jim Crow" stage of integrating lunch counters and has subsequently learned much about the depth of racism in American society, so the observer of Portuguese Africa must turn away from the obvious lack of printed legal discrimination to discover the true depth of racism in Portuguese colonial society.

Most of the important errors in *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* occur in the chapters on "Education, Health and Social Welfare" and "Current Racial Character", chapters which closely follow the official Portuguese point of view and in their one-sidedness are the weakest parts of the book. For instance, "In small towns such as Nampula and Quelimane", it is said, "there is a friendly mixing and a minimum of 'class consciousness'" (p.212). Yet to even the most inexperienced person visiting these two Mozambican towns, it should be obvious that they are divided along classic racial lines—even down to having the railroad tracks as psychological, as well as physical, dividers. The authors should have noticed that in both towns, the bars are filled with either whites (with a small scattering of well-dressed 'brown') or blacks—never both. Residential districts are divided along strict racial-class lines; new apartment buildings contain all whites, corrugated-iron-roofed buildings are populated by 'browns', and grass huts house all the blacks.

"The Government", it is said, "views the idea of community development as an integral part of its overall program" (p. 194). But the authors fail to make clear that the government's definition of "community development" is one in which everything down to the actual placement of the toilets is planned in the provincial capital and that all programs which might emphasize local initiative, decision-making or co-operatives are automatically ruled out. Any real community development is a threat and is halted on the grounds that it is "socially disruptive".

The increases in the size of the education system are correctly and accurately detailed, but the book fails to recognize the real aims of the expansion policy. The "reforms" to make primary education more "relevant" are actually efforts to limit the

The Cameroon Federation

Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society

Willard R. Johnson

The author shows how the 1961 federation of the British and French Cameroons attempted to integrate a highly fragmented society representing every social cleavage found in Africa, including disparate and bilingual colonial legacies. His analysis has relevance not only to Cameroon but to other parts of Africa and to societies in general. \$12.50

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Party Transformation and Economic Development

Henry Bienen

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The author discusses the events and significance of the Arusha Declaration in the light of his continued research since 1957. This expanded edition also includes a new Preface and Introduction and a long new chapter, "Bienen's analysis of the operation of party and administration in Tanzania injects a note of realism that is lacking in many other studies of African parties." *Africa Report* Cloth, \$11.50 Paper, \$3.45

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newly literate Africans to rural agricultural skills and aspirations, and that the newly dicte a desire to educate for political responsibility, nor does educational expansion reflect equal educational opportunity. In the new high school in Quelimane I found in 1968 only one non-white; a Goan male. In the government primary school there were a few brown but no black faces.

One last illustration, without documentation, *Portuguese Africa: a Handbook* suggests that it is the Government's policy to win over the African population. It is claimed that "massive retaliation would not be in accord with Portuguese policy. Portugal's strongest point has always been the loyalty, or at least neutrality of the majority of the population, and to increase repression, for example by large-scale napalm bombing, would have thrown this away" (p. 429).

But large-scale napalm bombing does in fact occur over vast areas of Mozambique and Angola. There are areas which the Government has simply ceded—has given up trying to supply them with normal services. In Mozambique, everything north of the road from Porto Amélia to Vila Cedral is regarded as "no man's land"; unauthorized movement in this 45,000-square-mile area is considered hostile. Pilots have told me that they bomb with napalm anything or anyone in this area.

Because Portuguese Africa has been ignored for such a long time in both academic and political circles, it is refreshing to see in print new and important collections of data. But inaccurate sociological or political generalizations are needed nowhere in the world, and least of all where there is such a dearth of information as in Portuguese-controlled Africa.

Expanding Horizons in African Studies, edited by Gwendolin M. Carter and Ann Paden. Northwestern University Press, 1969. 364 pp. Reviewed by Prof. Brian M. Fagan, of the Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara.

The Program of African studies at Northwestern University which has a distinguished record of research and teaching, recently celebrated its twentieth anniversary with a conference evalu-

ating "the current state of African studies and anticipating the methods and directions which will characterize African studies in the coming decades." *Expanding Horizons* is a volume of conference papers resulting from the September 1968 meeting.

Approximately 25 scholars contributed papers ranging from legal systems to art and from constitutional structures to sociolinguistic research. Twenty years of active cooperation between African and Ameri-

can scholars have resulted in an impressive body of scientific information, but only recently have people begun to wonder about the direction of African Studies in coming decades. Some of the trends can be seen within the often bland pages of *Expanding Horizons*.

The theme of a search for national unities recurs and with it a possible conflict of research objectives. As overseas scholars, we tend to have a preoccupation

New

Geographical Regions of Nigeria

Reuben K. Udo

This book is designed to serve as a reference work for the student or general reader who wants to learn about the land, the climate and vegetation, the people, and the economy of Nigeria. The presentation is in twenty chapters, grouped in three parts which fit the traditional division of the country into three zones—a southern zone or the coastlands of Guinea, a central zone or the middle belt, and a northern zone or the Nigerian Sudan.

1970 LC:70-94980 291 pages 156 illustrations \$9.50

Algeria

The Politics of a Socialist Revolution

David and Marina Ottaway

A dramatic account of the first six years of the Algerian socialist revolution. The authors, who lived in Algeria during much of this period (Mr. Ottaway was a correspondent for *The New York Times* and *Time* magazine), offer a wealth of first-hand information concerning the destruction of the colonial economic and social order, the formation of new power blocs, the attempts of Ahmed Ben Bella to forge a new economy and a modern political system, and the intricate alliances and rivalries among a small group of leaders.

1970 LC:70-85210 536 pages 11 photos \$8.75

Architecture in North Ghana

A Study of Forms and Functions

Labelle Prussin

with an introduction by Walter Goldschmidt

Mrs. Prussin's preoccupation here is with indigenous architectural forms and settlement patterns in northern Ghana. The author argues that, within a given society, there are several constants that determine the creation of physical forms. Such determinants are the natural environment, the way this environment is exploited to provide food and shelter, the social, political, and religious relationships which have evolved in that process of exploitation, and finally, the external historical influences brought to bear upon the indigenously evolved way of life.

1970 LC:75-84780 136 pages 98 illustrations 7 maps \$8.95



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with searching analyses, comparative studies, and methodological problems, while several of the African contributors stress the importance of "relevant" research on projects which serve the objectives of national unity. No one challenges the urgent necessity for much basic research on projects which contribute to national unity or economic development. However, theoretical, basic, or methodological research can often directly assist or complement such relevant research. The positive tone of the conference papers suggests that both types of research can be coordinated with each other and that financial support and access will continue to be given for both. More collaboration in the future may also dispel some of the suspicion which American research often caused in the past by its apparent irrelevance to the host country. The large number of young students now planning to do field work in Africa will bear much of the responsibility for coordinating their projects with local needs. Access will entail deposition of research records and proper publication in a form readily available to host scholars.

Clearly, multi-disciplinary research is increasingly important in Africa. In her introduction, Professor Carter speaks of the ease with which scholars at the conference were able to discuss evidence from different disciplines in detail. The next stage is the creation of multi-disciplinary research projects oriented towards specific and relevant educational and economic problems in Africa. Such project development is likely to become a major activity in the next few years with African scholars playing a leading part.

The Northwestern conference indicates that African Studies is moving into a new phase. The head of the new wine has settled and the central issues of African research are beginning to crystallize. Area studies themselves are beginning to die a natural death, being replaced by a greater emphasis on multi-disciplinary studies and comparative international research projects of a problem-oriented nature. The febrile gushings of scholars intoxicated by the excitement which Africa's cultural heritage has to offer are being replaced by scholarly and more sober assessments of Africa's contribution to the world. Conference volumes like *Expanding Horizons* show us how much has been achieved in the last 20 years and at the same time, how little has been done on a systematic basis to solve the major prob-

lems facing Africa on a pragmatic level.

The practice of publishing such conference volumes is questionable. The papers are often of variable quality and the time lag between utterance and publication unduly long. But the proceedings of this conference have been published promptly and many of the papers are thought provoking. It is only regrettable that the proceedings are not rounded off with a hard-hitting essay outlining the major themes for the next two decades of African studies, themes clearly discerned from the conference papers.

The Hungry Future, by René Dumont and Bernard Rosier. Proeger, 1969. 271 pp. \$6.95 (translated from the French edition, *Nous Allons à la Famine*, 1966).

Reviewed by W. O. Jones, Assistant Professor of Government, Oberlin College.

Malthus was once seen as a misguided English pastor who urged abstinence from marriage to halt the geometric population growth while food supply increased only at an arithmetic rate. More recently, neo-Malthusians have argued that although Malthus' analysis might not apply to the developed world where increased agricultural and manufacturing productivity has expanded the economic pie and worker pressure increased the workers' share, much of the world is different. Nearly all the people in countries containing half the world's population are living at a subsistence level. The neo-Malthusians point out that the less developed world's population is growing at the unprecedented rate of 2.5 per cent a year owing to the public health revolution which has curtailed epidemics and lowered death rates, while sustained increases in food production rarely exceed 2 per cent a year. Thus, these nations suffer most because their agricultural methods are least able to respond to increasing needs and because they can least afford food imports. Rosier and Dumont accept this analysis in *The Hungry Future*.

However, this work was written during the height of panic and pessimism over the world food problem in 1966 and not made available in English until 1969. Rosier and Dumont follow the argument pioneered by Lester Brown in 1963 in *Man*

Land and Food stating that: 1) most of the populous poor countries are not farming all the land that can be plowed cheaply; 2) population growth and income-generated demand require rapid increases in food production; 3) if the gap continued to grow at the current rate, the U.S., as the world's chief grain exporter, could not continue to fill it with donations after 1985, even with maximum good will or rejuvenation of retired crop lands; 4) the alternative of a rapid and sustained increase in yields per unit of land has never been achieved before a country was well industrialized. The implications of such reasoning were seized upon by the various prophets of disaster, including lobbyists anxious to gain Congressional support for foreign-aid programs.

Rosier and Dumont also accepted the reasoning and cold-war analysis of the Paddock Brothers' *Famine 1975! America's Decision: Who will survive?* They argued that world starvation was inevitable by 1975 and that since the population of the poor countries would have to be left to starve, the U.S. should select to save those nations most friendly to it. This was called "Triage". Former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, even suggested that U.S. grain reserves might become one of our most strategic resources. The bibliography and footnotes of *The Hungry Future* indicate that Brown and *Famine 1975* were the main English sources which shaped these author's conceptions on the subject.

Neo-Malthusians are currently under attack and Rosier and Dumont's work reflects obsolete concepts in light of the "green revolution." The high-yielding, short-stawed, highly fertilizer-responsive, non-photosensitive rice and wheats which subsequently sparked this revolution were already known in 1966 at the time of writing of *The Hungry Future*. Furthermore, the U.S. food-aid program was already doing most of the things Dumont castigates it for not doing, such as insisting on reforms by recipients obliging them to manufacture or import fertilizers and support food prices, keeping them scared of famine by the "short-leash" policy which provided surplus foodstuffs on a year-to-year basis. The crop year of 1967-68 proved that unschooled, traditional farmers could succeed with the new varieties and the different farming techniques they required for these miracle grains. Skeptics argued however that 1967-68 had been an exception-

ally good climatic year in South Asia. But the following year, 1968-69, regarded as mediocre, confirmed the value of the new varieties with the successes of a much larger number of farmers producing more than double yields.

Just as public-health aid had lowered death rates by eliminating epidemics in developing countries long before they could have done so themselves, the new "miracle-rice" from the Philippines, "miracle-wheat" from Mexico, and now "miracle-maize" from Kenya produced the "yield take-off" at an earlier stage of development than had previously been the case. Farmers have been raising yield and increasing food production at well over two per cent a year in Mexico, Kenya, Pakistan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The *Hungry Future* could not have been written in the same way in the light of these developments.

How does this dated information affect what Rosier and Dumont say about Africa? The new grain varieties have scarcely been introduced in Africa since the danger of starvation is not imminent there, outside the Maghreb. Most of the continent has readily available land, but the ability of a rapidly growing number of Africans to keep alive by subsistence farming is not development. Although the "green revolution" may postpone the danger of famine and enable a much larger population to be fed more cheaply than expected, it does not eliminate the urgent need for population control which is as great in Africa as anywhere else.

Rosier's first four chapters are a reasonably good global outline of the food problem, even post-miracle grains. He takes the FAO plan to triple food production by the year 2000 too seriously, is slightly condescending towards Africa (e.g. fertilizer is premature and mixed farming is called for at present), and devotes too much attention to unconventional sources of food. However, Rosier is more aware of innovations taking place in the English-speaking world than Dumont appears to be. Although Rosier concentrates on what is being developed in Francophone countries, he recognizes the importance of amino-acid fortification, development of high-protein maize, and other important non-French advances.

Dumont's faults are far more serious. Although he is to be appreciated for his candid criticisms, as an agronomist he is a poor economist and strategist. He casti-

gates foreign aid as a colonial vestige, but calls for much more of it. To solve the world food problem by giving the FAO bureaucracy ten times its present resources is practically lunatic. Dumont's schemes for interdevelopment by international co-production, for a World Solidarity Fund and World Organization for Economic Co-operation, for equitable and remunerative prices, combine the worst of what Reinhold Niebuhr called American "vague internationalism" with similarly vague French notions that world trade can somehow be 'managed' to everyone's benefit. The ultimate absurdity comes when Dumont suggests that there be internationally acknowledged experts to arbitrate the allocation of world aid, two of whom are unsuitable or unable to execute such a responsibility. The noted Egyptian economist on the list cannot return to the U.A.R. because his political ideology is not tolerated and the respected Polish economist Oskar Lange had been dead for half a year before *The Hungry Future* went to press. Furthermore, Dumont's concrete suggestions are also faulty. To recommend the use of desalted sea water for farming, even with improved techniques, reflects a lack of understanding about the economics of farming and the physics of water desalination.

On Africa, Dumont's agronomic advice is usually sound and often perceptive. But even here he fails to understand the importance of food self-sufficiency to the Africans. The belief in the need to produce enough subsistence crops rather than lack of discipline, is probably why Chadian and Camerounian cotton farmers do not follow French advice on planting dates. Furthermore the prejudice against fertilizer and for mixed farming in Savannah regions is a position consistent with French colonial development doctrine just prior to independence. Throughout, sweeping generalizations are coupled with a bewildering array of often unrelated examples gathered in a host of countries during Dumont's whirlwind tours.

The Hungry Future is already a dated book. Those interested in Dumont's judgement and often insightful prejudices about African agriculture and politico-social problems ought to read his earlier book, *False Start in Africa*—and those interested in a global picture of the food problem would get more information and balance from Lester Brown's *Seeds of Change*, which was published earlier this year.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:

SOUTH AFRICAN JEWS; AFRICANS AND AFRO-AMERICANS, AN AFRICAN STUDENT'S VIEW; SCULPTURE EXHIBIT DATES

Africans and the ASA

I have read Mr. Insourie's letter on the ASA meeting at Montreal (see *Africa Report*, March 1970), and as an African student like himself, I cannot let it go unchallenged.

I believe very strongly that ASA must be revamped in a manner that will force it to see Africa as a land of blacks that have an independent idiom and identity; this image must not be a reflection and distortion of what Euro-American scholars want Africa to be.

I would have assumed that African students in this country should fight side by side with the Afro-Americans to cleanse the image of black people. It is after all in this country that many of us are called "niggers with a foreign accent." If up to now our relationship with black Americans has not been "particularly wonderful", it is our challenge to bridge the gap, recognizing that if we have been asked "offensively naive questions" the cause has been "whitewashed" and the Hollywood image of Africa.

Instead of understanding this, Mr. Insourie denounces Afro-Americans as "self-appointed spokesmen of Mother Africa". To whom, may I ask, is Africa a "mother," if not the black race? It is high time con-

The William Fagg African Sculpture Exhibit reviewed in *Africa Report*, April 1970, will be shown at the Brooklyn Museum, New York City, from May 19 through June 21.

tinental Africans were educated to the fact that the African [black] personality is indivisible.

I hope that with the active participation of our Afro-American brothers, Africa will be listened to more. Is it strange that Africa is getting diminishing aid? Is it surprising that the Africa Section of the State Department is the most neglected and smallest in the entire building? Africa had better chew, swallow, and digest the fact that America's diplomacy is directly dependent upon the lobbying of either ethnic or shared-interest groups, and until black Americans actively lobby for Africa, that continent will continue to enjoy "benign neglect."

Finally, Mr. Insourie makes another dangerous error when he asserts that "CIA infiltration, perpetuation of neo-colonialism, imperialism are popular clichés which serve psychological purposes." This exposes his ignorance of a real threat to Africa. Many African leaders know this,

and are either victims of it or are scared stiff. Africa exists within an imperialistic sphere of influence, and I find it incredible that Mr. Insourie can dismiss concern over the fact as mental hang-ups.

Wanyandey Songha,
Philadelphia

Rubin: official reply

A misleading impression may have resulted from the "explanation" of my attitude which you appended to Prof. Rubin's article on South African Jewry, (see *Africa Report*, February 1970).

I categorically challenge Prof. Rubin's statement that "it is an open secret in South Africa that the Jewish Board of Deputies does all it can to discourage individual Jews from opposing Government policies." On the contrary, although the Board itself has not taken up an official stand on apartheid, it has not only refrained from interfering with the freedom of the individual, but has time and again urged Jewish citizens to express, and to live up to, their personal political convictions.

Prof. Rubin recalls at some length some of the deplorable pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic manifestations which, during the 1930s and 1940s, marred the policies of the National Party—then the official Opposition party, and now the party in power.

Much of what he records is factually correct. These things did indeed happen, most regrettably. However, his telescoped version of the developments of nearly 35 years of complex political history contrives to give a very one-sided and indeed, a distorted impression. Most important, it omits the salient and very welcome fact that this unhappy chapter belongs to the past. "Jewish life continues a normal course in South Africa. The Jewish community is well integrated and the Jewish citizen enjoys full opportunities in all spheres . . ." (Report to the Board of Deputies 1967).

G. Saron,
General Secretary,
S. A. Jewish Board of Deputies,
Johannesburg

Correction

The review of the book *Agricultural Cooperatives and Markets in Developing Countries* in the February issue, attributed to Dr. Carl Eicher, was in fact by Dr. Elon Gilbert, currently working as an economic advisor in Ghana.

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